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STATUTORY DAMAGE CAPS ARE AN INCOMPLETE
REFORM: A PROPOSAL FOR ATTORNEY FEE
SHIFTING IN TORT ACTIONS
Gregory A. Hicks*
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, tort law reformers, have exploited the prevalent belief that
excessive compensation of nonpecuniary losses is in part responsible for
the high cost and decreased availability of liability insurance in order
to promote statutory caps on noneconomic damage awards.' Advocates
of unrestricted compensation damages have, in their turn, defended the
awards and sought their reinstatement in jurisdictions where legislative
reforms have restricted the awards but have failed to address adequately
the deficiencies in noneconomic damage compensation that made the
awards vulnerable to attack.' The premise of this article is that the
currently unsettled status of noneconomic damage awards offers an
opportunity to reexamine the function of such awards, and to move
tort law in the direction of more stable and rational remedies, something
that could not be achieved either under recently adopted damage cap
statutes or through the reinstatement of unrestricted compensation of
noneconomic losses.
A proposal originally offered by Professor Jeffrey O'Connell' as an
element of a comprehensive no-fault compensation scheme 4 may provide
the proper basis for further reform of noneconomic damage awards5 in
Copyright 1989, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Washington School of Law.
1. See infra note 17 and infra text accompanying notes 17-23.
2. See infra text accompanying notes 45-58.
3. O'Connell, A Proposal to Abolish Defendants' Payment for Pain and Suffering
in Return for Payment of Claimants' Attorneys' Fees, U. Ill. L. Rev. 333 (1981).
4. Professor O'Connell's law reform proposals have persistently advocated the adop-
tion of a no-fault regime for the compensation of accidental injuries. See, e.g., J.
O'Connell, The Lawsuit Lottery (1979); J. O'Connell & R. Simon, Payment for Pain
and Suffering: Who Wants What, When and Why (1972); R. Keeton & J. O'Connell,
Basic Protection for the Traffic Victim (1965).
5. The phrase "noneconomic" or "nonpecuniary" damages or losses is to be un-
derstood throughout this paper as referring to the entire class of psyhic injuries, including
such injuries as pain and suffering, mental anguish, emotional distress, and loss of society
and companionship, all of which are commonly understood to result in subjective non-
monetary losses which tort law nonetheless compensates by the award of money damages.
See, Dobbs, Remedies § 8.1, at 544-45 (1973).
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personal injury litigation. Professor O'Connell called for limiting re-
coveries for noneconomic damages to nominal amounts and awarding
prevailing plaintiffs their attorneys' fees together with compensation for
proven special damages. 6 This proposal, which appeared prior to the
recent preoccupation with tort reform, was grounded on the observation
that noneconomic damages are haphazardly awarded, are marginally
related to their ostensible purpose, and are routinely used as an indirect
and covert means of paying plaintiffs' legal fees and trial expenses. 7
Although Professor O'Connell described the deficiences of noneconomic
damage compensation and stated a case for adopting a remedy system
based on provable economic losses, he did not address how an attorney's
fee award scheme might actually be implemented, nor explore the effect
of awarding plaintiffs' legal fees in a conventional tort setting.' His
proposal does, however, offer a framework for the reform of personal
injury tort remedies. O'Connell's approach, applied to the present con-
troversy over whether noneconomic damages should be capped at mod-
erately high levels or should remain unrestricted, would call for virtual
abolition of the awards and for the substitution of a remedy structure
based on compensation of attorneys' fees and economic losses, a structure
more routinely responsive to the actual economic losses that arise from
tort injuries.
There are already some small signs of willingness to restructure tort
remedies upon foundations that do not include noneconomic damages.
For example, although several courts have sustained challenges to stat-
utory damage caps on state constitutional grounds, 9 those same courts
6. O'Connell, supra note 3. See infra text accompanying notes 63-68.
7. See, O'Connell, supra note 3; O'Connell & Simon, supra note 4; Zelermyer,
Damages for Pain and Suffering, 6 Syracuse L. Rev. 27 (1954) (reviewing cases illustrative
of the haphazard process of tort general damage awards and the erratic character of the
awards themselves).
8. See O'Connell, supra note 3.
9. See, e.g., Boyd v. Bulala, 647 F. Supp. 781 (W.D. Va. 1986) (declaring uncon-
stitutional the Virginia statute, which imposes a $1,000,000 cap on economic and non-
economic damages combined); White v. State, 661 P.2d. 1272 (Mont. 1983) (invalidating
on the basis of a strict scrutiny equal protection analysis the restriction of nonpecuniary
awards to $250,000 in actions against the state; recognizing the right to tort recovery as
a fundamental right protected under the Montana constitution); Carson v. Maurer, 424
A.2d 825 (N.H. 1980) (invalidating across-the-board noneconomic damages cap of $250,000);
Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125- (N.D. 1978) (invalidating statutory cap of $300,000
on medical malpractice recovery, the cap including both economic and noneconomic
damages); Wright v. Central Du Page Hosp. Ass'n. 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976)
(invalidating statute limiting total recovery in medical malpractice actions to $500,000);
Smith v. Department of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 1987) (holding a $450,000 cap on
noneconomic damages to be an unconstitutional violation of right to trial by jury and
right to access to the courts).
The Texas courts are split. Compare Baptist Hosp. of Southeast Texas v. Baber, 672
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have suggested that noneconomic damages might be eliminated if
the substantive effectiveness of plaintiffs' remedies could be preserved
by other means.' 0 Indeed, the sharpened attack on noneconomic
S.W.2d 296 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (invalidating statutory limitation of damages other than
medical expenses to a maximum of $500,000 in medical malpractice actions) with Rose
v. Doctors Hosp. Facilities, 735 S.W.2d 244 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (statute constitutional);
Detar Hosp. v. Estrada, 694 S.W.2d 359 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985) (statute unconstitutional);
Malone & Hyde, Inc. v. Hobrecht, 685 S.W.2d 739 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985) (statute un-
constitutional); Waggoner v. Gibson, 647 F. Supp. 1102 (N.D. Tex. 1986) (statute un-
constitutional).
The Florida and New Hampshire courts are the only state supreme courts that have
addressed the narrow question of the constitutionality of general restrictions on nonpe-
cuniary awards. See Smith, 507 So. 2d 1080, and Carson, 424 A.2d 825. The court in
Carson found the imposition of a universally applicable $250,000 damage cap on non-
pecuniary awards an arbitrary deprivation of the plaintiff's right to reasonable recovery.
424 A.2d at 836-38. The New Hampshire court took the position that although the right
to recover for personal injuries is not a fundamental right which requires strict equal
protection scrutiny, it is nonetheless an important substantive right. In the court's view,
such rights are not to be restricted in the absence of a showing that the restriction is
reasonable, not arbitrary, and rests upon some "ground of difference having a fair and
substantial relation to the object of the legislation." Id. at 831. The court went on to
find that the invidious treatment of nonpecuniary awards by the legislature could not be
justified on the basis of this standard, suggesting however that restriction of non-economic
damages could be acceptable if some quid pro quo remedy'were substituted. Id. at 837-
38.
The New Hampshire statute has been amended since Carson. Presently, recovery for
nonpecuniary losses is restricted to a maximum of $875,000. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
508:4-d (Supp. 1986). It is difficult to see why $875,000 is any less arbitrary than $250,000,
though perhaps the higher maximum reflects a more balanced accommodation of the
competing interests of adequate compensation and control of runaway awards.
The Florida court in Smith held unconstitutional the imposition of a $450,000 damage
cap on the ground that the plaintiffs' rights to access to the courts and to trial by jury
were impermissibly restricted. The court found that neither restriction could be permitted
unless a reasonable alternative remedy were provided or commensurate benefit to the
plaintiff were established, or there were a legislative showing of overpowering public
necessity for abolishment of the right and no alternative method of meeting such public
necessity could be shown. 507 So. 2d at 1088. The Florida holding has stimulated a
citizens' initiative to adopt an amendment to the state constitution permitting caps on
noneconomic damages. The Florida Court has ruled that the proposed amendment would
be lawful if adopted as a result of citizens' vote. In re Advisory Opinion to Atty. Gen.,
520 So. 2d 284, 287 (Fla. 1988).
Decisions in other jurisdictions have overturned legislation restricting tort recoveries
against specific classes of defendants, see, e.g., Baptist Hosp., 672 S.W.2d 296, and
White, 661 P.2d 1272, or legislation restricting recoveries for economic losses as well as
noneconomic losses. See, e.g., Arneson, 270 N.W.2d 125, and Wright, 63 Ill. 2d 313,
347 N.E.2d 736.
10. See, e.g., Wright, 63 I11. 2d at 327-30, 347 N.E.2d at 742-43; Carson, 424 A.2d
at 837-88 (on noneconomic damages); Cf. Smith, 507 So. 2d at 1088.
Workers' compensation schemes and defined benefit no-fault schemes are typically noted
as examples where common law rights have been abrogated in exchange for offsetting
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damages" has led some defenders of the awards to reformulate their
arguments by stressing less the preservation of noneconomic recoveries
as such and emphasizing more the preservation of substantially effective
plaintiffs' remedies. 2 Even more telling indications of the need for a
fresh approach to noneconomic damage reform can be found in those
decisions in which courts have upheld the validity of statutory damage
caps 3 and have approved the restrictions that those caps impose on
advantages that either enhance the likelihood of compensation or that assure reasonably
adequate compensation through alternative means. Wright, 63 I11. 2d at 327-28, 347 N.E.2d
at 742.
The view that such statutory quid pro quo's are required in order for limitations on
tort recovery to be acceptable has been urged by Learner, Restrictive Medical Malpractice
Compensation Schemes: A Constitutional "Quid Pro Quo" Analysis to Safeguard Indi-
vidual Liberties, 18 Harv. J. on Legis. 143 (1981). Learner considers the right to damages
for personal injury a right to the preservation of one's personality. This right is viewed
as having constitutional dignity triggering a heightened equal protection scrutiny and
requiring the provision of directly offsetting benefits should the remedies provided by the
common law be restricted.
11. For example, in Florida the overturning of damage caps in Smith has been
followed by an attempt to impose damage caps in a constitutionally acceptable manner.
In In re Advisory Opinion to Atty. Gen., 520 So. 2d 284 (Fla. 1988), the Florida court
issued an advisory opinion that if caps on noneconomic damages were adopted by means
of an amendment to the Florida constitution proposed and approved through the mech-
anism of a citizens' initiative petition, damage caps would be constitutional.
12. See supra note 10.
13. See, e.g., Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137, 157-65, 695 P.2d
665, 679-84, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368, 382-87, appeal dismissed, 474 U.S. 892, 106 S. Ct. 214
(1985) (no substantial federal question); Sibley v. Bd. of Supervisors of L.S.U., 462 So.
2d 149 (La. 1985); Prendergast v. Nelson, 199 Neb. 97, 256 N.W.2d 657 (1977); State
ex. rel. Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d 491, 261 N.W.2d 434 (1978).
A Washington decision may point in the same direction, though the facts of the case
did not squarely raise the issue of the constitutionality of damage caps. Daggs v. City
of Seattle, 110 Wash. 2d 49, 750 P.2d 626 (1988) reviewed a municipal ordinance which
imposed a sixty-day waiting period on the filing of tort claims against the City of Seattle
and incidentally caused the plaintiff's lawsuit to be subject to the newly adopted Tort
Reform Act which capped noneconomic damages. The Washington court rejected plaintiff's
claim that enforcement of the waiting period unconstitutionally deprived plaintiff of the
right to recover unrestricted tort damages which he would have enjoyed under the old
law. Dore, J., writing for the court stated in passing that the right to tort recovery was
not a constitutional right. Id. at 57, 750 P.2d at 630. The Washington court currently
has pending a case that squarely raises the question of the constitutionality of Wash.
Rev. Code § 4.56.250 (1988), the state's damage cap statute, under the Washington
constitution. Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., Docket No. 54610-0.
The decision of the Indiana court in Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., 404 N.E.2d 585
(Ind. 1980), sustaining a $500,000 cap on economic damages in actions against health
care providers, is sometimes numbered among those decisions sustaining legislative remedy
restrictions. This inclusion is somewhat inappropriate. At issue in Johnson was a statute
creating a state compensation fund as a quid pro quo for the imposition of damage caps.
In order for health care providers to enjoy the protection of the $500,000 cap, the statute
ATTORNEY FEE SHIFTING
plaintiff's remedies. These latter decisions threaten the future of no-
neconomic damage compensation. Further, the rulings in these decisions,
together with the argument of some commentators that the proper
response to the legislative restriction of noneconomic damage awards is
the reinstatement of uncapped noneconomic damage awards, 4 invite the
question of whether the tort compensation system should be revised in
such a way that it does not depend on generous compensation of
intangible loss.
This article has two parts. In the first part, the ambiguous role of
noneconomic damages, that is, their function as makeweight compen-
sation for noncompensable litigation expenses and as compensation for
real intangible injuries, is described. This ambiguity has clouded the
question of whether noneconomic damage awards can be justified in
their own right. The first part further shows how the tort reform
movement has deflected discussion of the critical role of noneconomic
damages as makeweight compensation and, thereby, has produced a
debate that concerns primarily the value of the awards as compensation
for their ostensible purpose, that is, as compensation for pain and
suffering and for other psychic harms. 5 This focus of debate ignores
evidence that noneconomic damage awards have flourished because they
are needed to pay attorneys' fees, and obscures the question of whether
noneconomic damages should be replaced by a remedy that is more
routinely responsive to the tort victim's compensable losses. In the second
part of the article, the merits and difficulties of adopting a system of
attorney fee awards in lieu of continuing the present system of com-
pensation for noneconomic injuries are considered. This part of the
article describes in particular the structuring of a fee awards system
appropriate for personal injury litigation and the administrative chal-
lenges of making such a system workable. The growing body of com-
requires that they contribute to the compensation fund. This structure, unlike the statutes
which simply limit recoveries, involves the provision of a substitute remedy, an approach
which has been approved even in jurisdictions which have found damage caps unconsti-
tutional. See, e.g., Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d at 837-38; Wright v. Central Du Page
Hosp. Ass'n., 347 N.E.2d at 742.
14. Most notably, that included in the Report of the American Bar Association's
Action Commission to improve the Tort Liability System. See, Report of the Action
Commission to Improve the Tort Liability System 10-15.(ABA 1987) (hereinafter ABA
Commission Report).
15. The efforts of the defenders of noneconomic damages, who, in general, have
conceded little to those who argue that the system of unrestricted noneconomic damages
is flawed, id., see also Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137, 168-79, 695
P.2d 665, 687-92, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368, 390-95 (1985) (Bird, C.J., dissenting), depend on
the proposition that nonecomic damages can be fully justified as a necessary and desirable
remedy for intangible loss, a proposition that seems suspect on closer examination. See
infra text accompanying notes 42-44 and 52-58.
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mentary that concerns the treatment of attorneys' fees as compensable
losses in ordinary civil litigation is also examined. 6
II. THE FUNCTION OF NONECONOMIC DAMAGE AWARDS
A. The Restriction of Noneconomic Damage Awards
In response to public clamor, many states have enacted laws re-
stricting plaintiffs' tort remedies in hopes of reducing the cost and
improving the availability of tort liability insurance.' 7 One of the most
16. See infra text accompanying notes 86-91.
17. For descriptions of how escalating insurance costs and decreased availability of
coverage have been used to justify revisions to tort remedies, see, e.g., Priest, The Current
Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 Yale L.J. 1521 (1987); Symposium: Issues in
Tort Reform, 48 Ohio St. L.J. 317 (1987); Rabin, Some Reflections on the Process of
Tort Reform, San Diego L. Rev. 13 (1988); Comment, Rumors of Crisis: Considering
the Insurance Crisis and Tort Reform in an Information Vacuum, 37 Emory L.J. 401
(1988).
Despite the push to restrict plaintiffs' remedies, the reasons for the crisis in liability
insurance markets are much in dispute. Efforts to attribute the crisis to excessive litigation
and overly generous plaintiffs' remedies have in general given way to explanations that
emphasize either the imprudent business practices and collusive activities of insurance
companies or the effect on insurance rates of imprecise and malleable standards of liability.
Compare, e.g., Belotti, Van de Kamp, Thornburg, Mattox, Brown & LaFollette, An
Analysis of the Causes of the Current Crisis of Unavailability and Unaffordability of
Liability Insurance (May 1986) (Prepared for the National Association of Attorneys Gen-
eral, this report concludes that the cyclical nature of the insurance industry is largely
responsible for the current crisis and that changes in the civil justice system are not likely
to solve the current or future problems in availability and affordability of insurance.);
Nader, The Corporate Drive to Restrict Their Victim's Rights, 22 Gonz. L. Rev. 15 (1986)
(viewing the insurance crisis as a self-inflicted phenomenon created by the underwriting
practices of the industry and intended to justify an assault on a remedies structure already
inadequate at providing effective compensation to the great majority of claimants) and
Waldman, Insurers, Long Free of Antitrust Curbs, Face Rising Challenges, Wall St. J.,
July 8, 1988, at 1, 6 (describing the growing pressures to abolish the antitrust immunity
of the insurance industry because of alleged collusive activity in forcing revision of tort
remedies), with Mooney, The Liability Crisis-A Perspective, 32 Vill. L. Rev. 1235 (1987);
Priest, supra; and Clarke, Warren-Boulton, Smith & Simon, Sources of the Crisis in
Liability Insurance: An Economic Analysis, 5 Yale J. on Reg. 367 (1988) (each concluding
that the operation of indeterminate common law liability rules has had a substantial effect
on the price and availability of certain classes of liability coverage). Professor Priest in
particular has minimized the role played by the size of damage awards in determining
the cost and availability of liability insurance. He views as more significant the uncertain
application of broadly stated definitions of due care or product defectiveness which make
it difficult to predict whether a given level of care will or will not result in liability. This
indeterminacy frustrates the creation of discreet insurance risk pools, and so causes all
buyers of insurance to be burdened with premium prices which reflect the risk that their
utmost precautions will be found inadequate.
The emergence of these explanations has made the hope that insurance might become
cheaper and more available as a result of restricting damage recoveries seem a vain hope.
See infra note 22.
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common limitations on plaintiffs' remedies appearing in the new statutes
is the restriction of damage awards for noneconomic losses, 8 that class
of injuries that includes pain and suffering and other psychic hurts. 9
Awards for such losses must be controlled, the reformers argue, because
they are unusually susceptible to overstatement and abuse, 20 and therefore
18. At this writing, at least thirty states have adopted legislation which limits to some
degree the plaintiff's maximum recovery of proven damages. Of this number, eight states
have adopted statutes of general application, Alaska Stat. § 09.17.010 (Supp. 1987)
($500,000 except in cases of disfigurement or severe physical impairment); Colo. Rev.
Stat. § 13-21-102.5 (1987) ($250,000 unless clear and convincing evidence indicates greater
damages warranted; in no case more than $500,000); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 768-80 (Supp.
1988) ($450,000); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 663-8.7 (Supp. 1987) ($375,000 except for specified
types of torts such as strict and products liability, intentional torts, and environmental
pollution torts); Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. 11-108 (Supp. 1988); Minn. Stat.
Ann. § 549.23 (Supp. 1988) ($400,000 for intangible losses; does not include pain and
suffering); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 508:4-d (Supp. 1988) ($875,000); and Wash. Rev.
Code Ann. § 4.56.250 (Supp. 1988).
The alternative approach has been to restrict plaintiffs' recoveries only in those actions
brought against defendants who are viewed as particularly susceptible to the high cost
and restricted availability of liability insurance characteristic of the "insurance crisis."
Thus, some of the new statutes restrict plaintiffs' maximum recoveries only in medical
malpractice actions while others extend protection to vulnerable groups such as charitable
institutions or states and their political subdivisions. See, e.g. statutes in Cal. Civ. Code
Ann. § 3333.2 (limiting noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases to $250,000)
(1975 and Supp. 1986). Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 600.1483 (Supp. 1987) ($225,000 in
medical malpractice cases unless, among other exceptions, tort causes death, injury involves
reproductive system, limb or organ wrongfully removed or vital bodily function lost);
Mo. Ann. Stat. § 538.210 (Supp. 1987) ($350,000 per defendant in medical malpractice
actions); Mont. Code Ann. § 2-9-108 (1987) ($750,000 for each claim, $1.5 million for
each occurrence against political subdivisions; statute terminates in 1991); S.C. Code Ann.
§ 15-78-120 (Supp. 1987) (limits total damages to $250,000 per plaintiff and $500,000 per
occurrence against political subdivision).
In general, the statutes adopted before the explosion of new reform legislation in 1986
and early 1987 were directed at control of damages in medical malpractice litigation. See,
Smith, Battling a Receding Tort Frontier: Constitutional Attacks on Medical Malpractice
Laws, 38 Okla. L. Rev. 195, 200-01 (1985). The statutes of general application reflect
the tort reform juggernaut which has undertaken wholesale revisions of existing remedies.
19. See supra note 5.
20. See, e.g., Report of the Tort Policy Working Group on the Causes, Extent and
Policy Implications of the Current Crisis in Insurance Availability and Affordability 1,
2 (U.S. Dept. of Justice Feb. 1986). However, there is strong countervailing evidence that
nonpecuniary damage awards are neither excessive nor wildly unpredictable in the great
mass of cases. See Daniels & Martin, Civil Jury Awards Are Not Out of Control, 26
Judges 10 (1987) (setting out the results of a broadly based study of civil jury awards
in state trial courts from 1981 through 1985). The authors state that very few awards
for noneconomic and special damages combined approach the $250,000 to $500,000 range
for noneconomic damage awards typical of many of the recent statutory damage caps.
See also Hensler, Trends in Tort Litigation: Findings from the Institute for Civil Justice's
Research, 48 Ohio St. L.J. 479 (1987) (noting a general increase during recent years in
rates of litigation and in the size of tort damage awards, the author of this Rand Institute
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cause high insurance rates and restricted insurance coverage. 2' Although
there are growing doubts about the good faith of those advocating the
tort remedy restrictions that some states have recently adopted,2 2 and
about the effectiveness of those restrictions in controlling the cost and
study is nonetheless unwilling to conclude that the data collected show that damage awards
or rates of litigation are disproportional or reflect undesirable patterns).
21. See supra note 20. While studies conducted for the Rand Institute of Civil Justice
indicate that damages recovered in medical malpractice actions have in fact decreased in
jurisdictions which have limited operation of the collateral source rule and capped recoveries
for noneconomic injuries, see, Danzon, The Frequency and Severity of Medical Malpractice
Claims: New Evidence, 49 Law & Contemp. Probs. 57 (1986), it seems to be becoming
clearer that reductions in damages will not be accompanied by lower rates and improved
coverage. See supra note 17 and infra note 22.
For other studies exploring litigation patterns in malpractice actions, see also Danzon,
Medical Malpractice: Theory, Evidence and Public Policy (1985); Danzon, The Frequency
and Severity of Medical Malpractice Claims, 27 J. L. & Econ. 115 (1984); Danzon and
Lillard, Settlement Out of Court: The Disposition of Medical Malpractice Claims, 12 J.
Legal Stud. 345 (1983).
22. These doubts about the tort revision movement draw strength from the growing
evidence that the legislative changes that have so systematically restricted plaintiffs' remedies
will not in fact produce the hoped for improvements in the cost and availability of
insurance coverage. See, e.g., U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Medical Malpractice: 6 State
Case Studies Show Claims and Costs Still Rise Despite Reforms 39 (GAO/HRD-87-21,
DEC. 1986) [hereinafter "GAO Case Studies"]; Hilder, Insurers' Push to Limit Civil
Damage Awards Begins to Slow Down: States Resist Major Changes, And Some Link
Ceilings to Insurance-Rate Cuts, Wall St. J., August 1, 1986, at 1, 8; Belotti, supra note
17; Nader, supra note 17; Schroeter & Rutzick, Tort Reform-Being an Insurance Company
Means Never Having to Say You're Sorry, 22 Gonz. L. Rev. 31 (1986); Hutner & Angoff,
Tort Reform Legislation Ought to Reduce Premiums, Wall St. J. Feb. 11, 1987, at 26;
Kirsch, Prop. 51 Shakes (barely) the House of Torts, 6 Cal. Law. at 70-71 (June 1986).
The experience of states where restricted remedies are already in force seems to support
these doubts. For example, recent experience in Florida indicates that reduced liability
exposure may not be reflected in improvements in the cost and availability of insurance.
In Florida, liability insurers have overwhelmingly sought rates higher than those charged
in previous years, and two of the country's largest insurers have recently told the Florida
Insurance Department that their rates will not be affected by the state's new limitations
on compensation. Hutner & Angoff, supra. See also supra GAO case studies.
Recently, concerns about the good faith of insurance companies has resulted in lawsuits
by the attorneys general of the states of Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey, New
York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. This action against
insurers and reinsurers alleges collusion and conspiracy in setting rates and restricting
coverages, thereby creating the insurance crisis. See Waldman, supra note 17; Fact Sheet
on the Multi-State Insurance Antitrust Litigation, Office of the Attorney General of the
State of Washington (Jun. 14, 1988). These actions have been consolidated for trial in
the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. A related complaint
was filed in state district court in Austin, Texas by the Attorney General of Texas. See
Texas v. Insurance Serv. Office, cause no. 439,089, filed Mar. 22, 1988 in the District
Court of Travis County, Texas.
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availability of insurance, state legislatures have widely accepted the need
for limitations on-plaintiffs' remedies.23
B. The Effect of Noneconomic Damage Caps on Compensation of
Legal Fees and Other Losses
The new damage caps reduce a plaintiff's potential recoverable dam-
ages by placing an upper limit on noneconomic recoveries.2 4 Unchanged,
however, is the established expectation of those familiar with American
tort litigation that the plaintiff will look to the noneconomic portion
of his damages not only to compensate him for those intangible injuries
for which the award is ostensibly made, but also to pay his attorneys'
fees. 2 This expectation is a joint product of the American practice of
not treating attorneys' fees as a compensable element of damages in
common law civil actions26 (the American Rule) and of the American
tradition of viewing the noneconomic portion of the plaintiff's recovery,
23. In addition to the imposition of damage caps, such measures as abolition or
modification of the collateral source rule, restricted access to punitive damage awards,
limitations on joint and several liability, and the reestablishment of tort immunities have
been adopted. Many of the new statutes have introduced procedural reforms such as
statutes of repose for products liability and medical malpractice claims, and made provision
for periodic payments of judgment.
Description of the large number and wide variety of statutory revisions affecting tort
remedies is beyond the scope of this article. The new laws have been monitored and
described in a series of continuing publications by the National Conference of State
Legislatures. See 1987 Summary: Liability Insurance (National Conference of State Leg-
islatures, July 31, 1987); 1987 Summary: Liability Insurance-February 27, 1987 Update
(National Conference of State Legislatures); General' Summary-1987 State Legislative
Action (National Conference of State Legislatures, January 30, 1987); 1986 Summary:
Liability lnsurance-(National Conference of State Legislatures, December 15, 1986); Tro-
lin, Civil Justice Reform in the States, 10 State Legis. Report, No. 14 (National Conference
of State Legislatures, December 1985).
Law review surveys of particular statutory reforms are beginning to appear. See, e.g.,
Comment, A Survey of the Collateral Source Rule: The Effects of Tort Reform and
Impact on Multistate Litigation, 53 J. Air L. & Com. 799 (1988); Note, 1986 Tort Reform
Legislation: A Systematic Evaluation of Caps on Damages and Limitations on Joint and
Several Liability, 73 Cornell L. Rev. 628 (1988).
24. See supra note 18.
25. See, e.g., Dobbs, Remedies § 8.1, 550 (1973); H. Ross, Settled Out of Court
239 (1970); O'Connell, supra note 3, at 351; Morris, Liability for Pain & Suffering, 59
Colum. L. Rev. 476, 477 (1959).
26. The practice of denying attorneys' fees as a recoverable element of damages will
be referred to as the "American Rule," its customary designation. An account of the
origins and development of the Rule is given by Leubsdorf, Toward a History of the
American Rule on Attorney Fee Recovery, 47 Law & Contemp. Probs. 9 (1984). Leubsdorf
observes that the Rule seems to have arisen from a self-evident expectation that clients
would pay their own legal fees. Only later was the Rule justified or challenged because
of its effect on the conduct of litigation. Id. at 27-31.
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rather than the plaintiff's recovery for proven economic losses, as the
primary source of payment for fee obligations. 27
The proposition that the award for noneconomic damages plays a
buffering role in the plaintiff's recovery, that is, provides a means of
funding litigation expenses so that the plaintiff's recovery for economic
losses will be preserved intact, involves awkward assumptions. It supposes
that a plaintiff's damage award for intangible injuries in particular,
rather than the plaintiff's total damage award for all losses, bears the
burden of the undercompensation inevitably produced by the American
Rule. It partially acknowledges that noneconomic damages lack legiti-
macy and that juries can easily manipulate them to compensate more
pressing and demonstrable losses. It is at odds with what might be
considered the more natural, intuitive view that the burdens of under-
compensation produced by the American Rule weigh equally on all the
plaintiffs' remedies, and that the victorious plaintiff is simply placed in
the position of allocating recoverable damages as he sees fit. 2
The issue of whether noneconomic damages play this buffering
compensation role is further complicated by uncertainty regarding whether
juries actually consider the impact of attorneys' fees on a tort victim's
net recovery. Some commentators have argued that jurors, in making
the general damage award, anticipate that the plaintiff will use part of
the award to pay the attorney's fees.f 9 Such arguments are often grounded
on the inference that juries are aware of the typical means of paying
attorneys' fees, an inference drawn from studies which reveal that the
noneconomic damage award often does not correspond to the gravity
of the plaintiff's injuries, but rather represents an amount adequate to
compensate both the plaintiff and his lawyer.30 An article by Professor
Harry Kalven,31 written to summarize findings of The Jury Project at
the University of Chicago Law School, offers the contrary opinion that
jurors, having once agreed on a proper damage figure, do not decide
27. See supra note 25.
28. The fact that some portion of the victim's total damage award will in all likelihood
be used to pay contingent fees means either that damage awards must be overstated to
assure an adequate net recovery of the plaintiff's economic and nonpecuniary losses after
the payment of contingent fees or that an award which is narrowly tailored to a factfinder's
best estimate of the scope of total damages will not be adequate after litigation expenses
have been paid. Where a factfinder is properly disciplined, undercompensation should be
the result. The inherent difficulty of noneconomic damages is that it is difficult to be
sure that such discipline is in fact being imposed because of the malleable and unquan-
tifiable nature of nonpecuniary awards.
29. Ingber, Rethinking Intangible Injuries: A Focus on Remedy, 73 Cal. L. Rev.
772, 810-11 (1985); Morris, supra note 25, at 477.
30. See J. O'Connell and R.J. Simon, supra note 4, at 6-7 and infra note 43.
31. Kalven, The Jury, the Law, and the Personal Injury Damage Award, 19 Ohio
St. L.J. 158, 163, 176-77 (1958).
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to add on an amount in order to enable the plaintiff to pay the fee.
Qualifying this conclusion, however, Professor Kalven acknowledged that
jurors are frequently knowledgeable about contingent fee arrangements
(despite the prohibition on their being so informed at trial) and that
because jurors arrive at general damage awards by a largely unreviewable
process that reflects a jumbled mixture of compensatory and retributive
objectives, the general damage award could well include some provision
for fees that would remain undetectable.3 2 Thus, jurors might take fee
obligations into account in setting a general damage award in the first
instance, even though they might be unwilling to make an explicit award
for fees as an addendum."
Whether the jury is aware that the plaintiff will allocate part of
the damage award to fees may, however, be less important than most
commentators have supposed. Because the arguments of counsel provide
the primary source of the jury's information on the appropriateness of
a given award, the jury is likely to gain its strongest impression of the
proper range for a general damage award from those competing ar-
guments. The awareness on the part of the plaintiff's counsel of the
need to seek a total recovery adequate both to compensate the plaintiff
and to pay fees and the expenses of litigation, will cause counsel to
argue for a combination of general and special damages that will be
adequate for these purposes. Thus, the connection between the amount
of a general damage award may reflect the need to provide for counsel
fees, to cover litigation costs and to provide adequate compensation for
the plaintiff's economic losses, independently of a jury's actual knowl-
edge that fees and expenses will be paid out of the damage award.
Despite the conceptual difficulties and factual uncertainties of ac-
knowledging that noneconomic damage awards play a makeweight com-
pensation role, recognition of this role has become widespread.3 4 As a
result, capping of noneconomic damages is viewed not only as dimin-
ishing the plaintiff's recovery for the psychic injuries that ostensibly
justify such damages, but also as exposing to demands for payment of
the expenses of litigation the plaintiff's damage award for economic
losses. For example, if a severely injured plaintiff has proved economic
damages in the amount of $1,500,000 and noneconomic damages in the
32. Id.
33. One commentator has noted that the later published H. Kalven & H. Zeisel, The
American Jury 149-62 (1966) shows that juries in fact do not include an assessment of
the lawyer's contingency fee in their award of damages. Jenkins & Schweinfurth, Cali-
fornia's Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act: An Equal Protection Challenge, 52
So. Cal. L. Rev. 829, 943 (1979). While the Kalven & Zeisel source does not discuss this
particular issue of jury conduct with any specificity, the 1958 Kalven article cited at supra
note 31 does.
34. See supra note 25.
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amount of $500,000, the effect of a $250,000 cap on noneconomic
damages, typical of several of the new statutes, 35 would be to diminish
the plaintiff's recovery from $2,000,000 to $1,750,000. If the plaintiff
and his attorney agreed to a contingent fee of thirty percent,3 6 the
plaintiff's recovery, after payment of that fee, would be reduced from
$1,400,000 to $1,225,000, a reduction that would cause the plaintiff's
net damage recovery to fall significantly short of the established economic
damages.
The tort cases that involve noneconomic damage awards large enough
to be affected in the manner described represent a small proportion of
all tort litigation 3 7 but the cases affected will be those where plaintiffs
have suffered severe economic losses and where the unrestricted award
35. See supra note 18.
36. A study by the Rand Institute for Civil Justice indicates that the portion of tort
recoveries that goes to plaintiffs' attorney fees and legal expenses ranges from a bit below
thirty percent to thirty-nine percent depending on the type of litigation, but that the
average amount is thirty to thirty-one percent of total compensation paid to plaintiffs.
Kakalik & Pace, Costs and Compensation Paid in Tort Litigation, Rand Institute for
Civil Justice (1986). See also Danzon, Contingent Fees for Personal Injury Litigation,
Rand Institute for Civil Justice (R-2458-HCFA) (1980); and Aronson, Attorney-Client Fee
Arrangements: Regulation and Review, 68 A.B.A. J. 284 (1982) (discussing the range of
reasonable contingent fee arrangements).
A number of tort reform statutes attempt to relieve the pressure of contingent fee
arrangements on the plaintiff's net recovery by setting limits on contingent fee awards.
See infra note 61. To the degree that contingent fee awards are reduced by such vehicles,
the effect of damage caps on the plaintiff's net recovery may be lessened. However, this
effect may be accomplished at the cost of making plaintiffs' cases less attractive to lawyers
who find the reduced fees inadequate, a significant risk in complex litigation demanding
extensive pre-trial discovery and the development of evidence dependent on scientific or
technical expertise. One empirical study has found that plaintiff lawyer effort in contingent
fee litigation increases significantly as the dollar stakes and complexity of the litigation
increases. Kritzer, Felstiner, Sarat & Trubek, The Impact of Fee Arrangement on Lawyer
Effort, 19 Law & Society Rev. 251, 267-73 (1985). Similarly, a Rand Institute study on
the resolution of medical malpractice claims reports that claims are most likely to be
dropped in states that impose statutory limits on contingent fees. The study concludes
that fee ceilings do more than cut down on "windfall" returns by discouraging spurious
litigation-that they also reduce the attorney's efforts and hence the probability of victory
for the plaintiff and the likely gross recovery and the net amount realized by the plaintiff.
Danzon & Lillard, Settlement Out of Court: The Disposition of Medical Malpractice
Claims, 12 J. Leg. Stud. 345, 362-63 (1983). See also Slovenko, Medical Malpractice and
the Lawyer's Contingent Fee, J. Psychiatry & L. 587, 595 n.27 (1984).
37. For example, in the years preceding California's adoption of its Medical Injury
Compensation Reform Act, which contains a provision limiting damages for noneconomic
losses to $250,000 in medical malpractice actions, Cal. Civ. Code Ann. § 3333.2 (1975
and Supp. 1988), a report of the state's Auditor General indicated that no more than
fourteen individuals in any given year received compensation of over $250,000 in none-
conomic and economic damages combined. See, California Auditor general, The Medical
Malpractice Insurance Crisis in California at 31 (1975).
For a more recent and broadly based study, see Daniels & Martin, supra note 20.
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of noneconomic damages theoretically would have provided more com-
pletely for their economic losses and for the payment of their legal fees
and expenses. The more significant point may be, however, that the
same skepticism about noneconomic damages that has stimulated recent
limitations of remedies may also be reflected in jurors' views of ap-
propriate noneconomic damage awards. Thus, even where maximum
awards of noneconomic damages are not limited by statute, jurors often
seem to be unwilling to award very large noneconomic damages, even
in cases of quite severe injury.3" The significance of this resistance is
that while statutory damage caps set upper limits of compensation, and
in cases of severe injury and high trial expenses assure undercompen-
sation, the same undercompensation may be produced without statutory
restrictions simply because jurors are not willing, regularly and pre-
dictably, to make large tort awards, even in cases where such awards
are called for. The more central problem may therefore be not the effect
of statutory damage caps on compensation, but rather the tort system's
continued reliance on a form of compensation that, because it is viewed
somewhat skeptically, may or may not be forthcoming.
C. How the Tort Reform Movement Has Limited the Range of
Objections to Noneconomic Damage Caps
As suggested above, the statutory restriction of noneconomic dam-
ages has generated controversy for two contradictory reasons. First, caps
on noneconomic losses, some critics contend, undermine the settled
expectation that tort plaintiffs will be able to look to the private damage
action for compensation of all proven injuries, including intangible losses.3 9
Second, damage caps purportedly jeopardize the plaintiff's ability to
attract legal representation and therefore to seek tort remedies. By
reducing the total damages recoverable, such caps diminish the likelihood
that the damage award will be adequate to meet the expenses of litigation
while providing for the plaintiff's injuries/ ° The first objection assumes
38. See text accompanying notes 75-76.
39. See ABA Commission Report, supra note 14, at 10-15. The first objection assumes
that noneconomic damage awards are justified in their own right, and accords with the
view that appropriate money compensation for intangible injuries can be determined,
however incalculable the underlying injury. Confidence that awards will be appropriate
must depend on a belief that the jury will be able to assign some roughly approximate
dollar value to the immeasurable and that the courts will be able to police the process
adequately. Underlying this willingness to allow money compensation is the assumption
that the law, confronted with an immeasurable loss, compensate, and deter such injuries
by awarding a sum of money that seems fair, however roughly determined. See Dobbs,
supra note 5, at 545-46; Zelermyer, supra note 7, at 34-38.
40. See Morris, supra note 25, at 477; Ingber, supra note 29, at 810-11; Peck,
Compensation for Pain: A Reappraisal in Light of New Medical Evidence, 72 Mich. L.
Rev. 1355, 1373 (1974).
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that noneconomic damages are justified in their own right. The second
objection assumes that noneconomic damages find their primary justi-
fication as a form of makeweight compensation, useful to meet losses
that would otherwise go uncompensated.
The incompatibility of these two objections to damage caps arises
not from any disagreement about the genuineness of the injuries that
justify nonpecuniary damages. The reality of psychic injuries is generally
acknowledged. 4 Rather, it is in part the routine application of none-
conomic damages to other losses that stimulates the question whether
the practice of generously compensating intangible injuries can be ac-
cepted on its own terms or compels a more realistic and practical
explanation. Furthermore, iconoclastic explanations of noneconomic
damages are encouraged by the essential incalculability of intangible
harms such as pain and suffering, 42 which makes problematic the relation
between given noneconomic awards and the injuries on which the com-
pensation is grounded. The uncertain relation between injury and com-
pensation has caused some commentators who defend noneconomic
damages to justify those damages in terms of the broad goals of adequate
overall compensation and retribution rather than in terms of any readily
demonstrable correlation between compensation sought and injury suf-
fered .43
It is a significant consequence of the attack that the tort reform
movement has launched against the integrity and size of noneconomic
damage awards that, of the two objections to noneconomic damage
caps, the objection that emphasizes the value of noneconomic damages
as collateral compensation may have become untenable. Defending no-
neconomic damages for their practical role plays into the hands of those
who have attacked the damages on the very ground that they are routinely
41. Morris, supra note 25, at 476-77.
42. There are numerous accounts of the arbitrariness and unverifiability of nonpe-
cuniary damage awards, emphasizing the indeterminable relation between the value of
money and pain and suffering injuries. These accounts emphasize that most damage
awards could be arbitrarily increased or diminished without compromising their respon-
siveness to the injuries intended to be compensated. See, e.g., Dobbs, supra note 5;
Ingber, supra note 29, at 778-79 (citing in particular P.S. Atiyah, Accidents, Compensation
and the Law 213 (3d ed. 1980)); O'Connell, supra note 3, at 341; Peck, supra note 40;
Zelermyer, supra note 7, at 34-38.
The incommensurability of intangible injuries is distinct from the problems of accurate
calculation of speculative economic losses such as future wages. Loss items such as future
earnings may be exceptionally difficult to establish accurately and may depend upon
substantial conjecture for their calculation, but ultimately they represent economic loss
measurable in dollar terms, however deficient the tools for accurate calculation may be.
43. The defense of the broad compensation function simply states that even if the
soundness of noneconomic damage awards cannot be verified, the awards help to provide
an aggregate recovery adequate to pay special damages and the costs of litigation. See,
e.g., Dobbs, supra note 5, at 550-51; Ingber, supra note 29, at 779.
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bloated to serve collateral purposes and cannot be justified in their own
right. Thus, one must now defend noneconomic damages on their own
terms. Alternatively, if one holds the practical view of noneconomic
damages, one must now either openly advocate alternative remedies that
will perform the remedial functions that noneconomic damage awards
have until now performed covertly, or argue the case for noneconomic
damages disingenuously. Unfortunately, most of the defenders of non-
economic damages have so far put forward only disingenuous-seeming
or incomplete arguments for preservation of the awards, perhaps sensing
that in the present climate the salvage of an endangered remedy is a
more likely prospect than the adoption of a novel remedy. An example
of an argument in favor of the restoration of noneconomic damages
that seems unpersuasive and incomplete is that of the report of the
American Bar Association (ABA) Commission to Improve the Tort
Liability System. 4
1. The ABA Commission Report
Commissioned to make recommendations to the ABA House of
Delegates for the improvement of the tort liability system, the ABA
Commission to Improve the Tort Liability System has proposed that
the statutory caps on nonpecuniary damages be abandoned and that
factfinders be permitted to award damages for intangible injury without
arbitrary limitations.4 5 The Commission's report was particularly harsh
in its attack on the arbitrariness of damage caps, 46 noting that the caps
typical of the new statutes assure that those who have suffered the most
devasting psychological injuries receive inadequate compensation. 47
The commission's criticism draws its strength from the fact that the
damage cap statutes have left noneconomic damages intact for all but
the most severe losses. The new statutes have thus not challenged the
principle of compensation for intangible injury as such, but have simply
restricted remedies when 'they "cost too much."' 48 The force of the
commission's criticism of invidious treatment of some noneconomic dam-
ages is reduced, however, by the indeterminacy that plagues all awards
for intangible injury.4 9 Because it is impossible, except on arbitrary terms,
to define appropriate dollar compensation for intangible injuries or to
know how to translate to a scale of dollars intangible injuries that vary
in severity, the argument that more severe intangible injuries demand
44. See ABA Commission Report, supra note 14.
45. Id. at 13.
46. Id. at 12.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See supra note 42.
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more dollars in compensation is not self-evident. The commission rec-
ommended that the tort system continue to strive for individualized
awards for intangible injury,50 but failed to consider as an alternative
the possibility of abandoning this effort and limiting money remedies
to harms that can be quantified. It is doubtful that the best cure for
the inequality of treatment of intangible injuries that is reflected in
damage cap statutes is the reinstatement of a system that has shown a
decided lack of success in providing appropriate levels of compensation.
Plaintiffs in small claims litigation often receive three or four times their
economic losses in general damage awards, no matter how trivial their
intangible injuries may be, simply to facilitate settlement of claims.5
On the other hand, the award of substantial general damage awards in
cases that presumably merit such awards is haphazard and comparatively
rare. The commission's recommendation would reinstate unrestricted
noneconomic damages, but offers little assurance that the undercom-
pensation of substantial injuries and the overcompensation of minor
injuries characteristic of general damage awards will be corrected.
The commission recognized and to some extent attempted to respond
to the inexactness of noneconomic damage calculation. The commission
report acknowledged that nonpecuniary awards are both prone to over-
statement and are difficult to estimate and, for that reason, proposed
the adoption of dollar guidelines for appropriate awards.5 2 The com-
mission further suggested that judges could and should control excessive
awards by granting motions for remittitur when justice so requires."
The difficulty with these suggestions for reform is that they offer no
help in determining when an award is excessive, except that of comparing
it to other awards for similar injuries. More significantly, the proposals
leave untouched the more fundamental weaknesses of an unrestricted
award system-that the value of all nonpecuniary awards is indeterminate
and that any given award, which may include undetectable padding,
may be regarded as "reasonable" simply because it lies within a range
of damages that has come to be accepted as reasonable for the type of
injury sustained.
Reliance on rough approximations that rest upon experience with
other awards might not be so troublesome if the rough estimates reflected
no more than someone's sensible effort to quantify the unquantifiable.
However, there is reason to believe that the size of expected noneconomic
damage awards in American tort litigation has expanded as attorneys'
fees and the costs of litigation have increased. 4 This evidence indicates
50. See ABA Commission Reports, supra note 14, at 10, 12.
51. See infra notes 72-73 and 82.
52. ABA Commission Report, supra note 14, at 13.
53. Id.
54. O'Connell & Simon, supra note 4, at 100-04.
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that the growth in size of noneconomic damage awards may have been
stimulated in part by pressures to generate a total damage award that
is responsive to the plaintiff's need to obtain compensation for injuries
and adequate to the costs of litigation, including attorneys' contingent
fees. It would be a distortion of the historical development of intangible
injuries to suggest that increased litigation costs and the need to provide
for legal fees is the single driving force behind expanded compensation
of noneconomic losses. Solicitude for psychic injuries and a refined
regard for the integrity of the personality, both characteristic features
of modern American tort law, have been consistently promoted by the
plaintiffs' trial bar.5 Nonetheless, the peculiarly American willingness
to permit unrestricted recovery for nonpecuniary injuries56 and the Amer-
ican expectation that the plaintiff will use part of the award for such
injuries to pay the attorney's contingency fee seem intertwined. 7 Con-
tingency fee arrangements in fact create incentives for the plaintiffs'
trial bar to expand recoveries for intangible injuries. 8 Furthermore, a
55. See, e.g., ABA Commission Report, supra note 14, at 10; O'Connell & Simon,
supra note 4, at 100-04; O'Connell, supra note 3, at 333-40.
56. The impulse of other common law systems has been to curb compensation of
nonpecuniary loss, with courts being drawn to standardized awards. One leading com-
mentator has noted both the strong Western attachment to the compensation of intangible
injuries and the need to confine the awards within reasonable bounds:
The resulting trend to more or less standardized awards ("flexible judicial
tariffs") is reinforced by the great value our law attaches to predictability, which
promotes settlements and satisfies a sense of justice demanding equal treatment
for equal cases. Uniformity is maintained by stringent appellate control over
awards and, especially in England, by displacing juries entirely from the realm
of assessing damages in favor of judges whose professionalism ensures adherence
to prevailing, judicially-imposed norms.
J. Fleming, The Law of Torts 211 (6th ed. 1983)
The trend towards standardization of awards has in the main also been a trend towards
the restriction of awards, though Professor Fleming notes as a contrary example that
standardized awards for lost faculties produce higher compensation for insensate victims
than would be the case if the victim's subjective awareness of loss formed the basis for
the damage award. Id. at 212-13. Nonetheless, and despite the fact that "more than half
the total amount paid out under the present tort system is apparently attributable to
nonpecuniary loss and to a particularly high proportion of small payments (in settlements),
id. at 211, recoveries for noneconomic damages in other common law countries are at
once more predictable and less generous than is the case under American tort law.
57. Professor John Leubsdorf, in considering the origins and continued vitality of
the American Rule, accounts for the absence of any concerted effort on the part of the
trial bar for broader awards of attorneys' fees by noting that so long as lawyers feel
able to rely on their clients to provide adequate fees, they will lack any incentive to
search for alternative solutions such as fee shifting. He cites as an example the expectation
of the tort plaintiffs' lawyer that the plaintiff's general damage recovery can be used as
a source of fees. Leubsdorf, supra note 26, at 31.
58. See O'Connell & Simon, supra note 4, at 51-54, 100-09, and O'Connell, supra
note 3, at 334-39 for descriptions of such devices as the per diem argument.
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litigation environment often dominated by the need for extensive dis-
covery and by the high costs of case development creates pressures to
enhance damage recoveries so that they provide for such expenses while
substantially preserving the plaintiff's net recovery. For these reasons,
even the "reasonable" noneconomic damage award may reflect not an
effort simply to quantify the intangible, but rather the effect of economic
pressures on the conduct of litigation.
The ABA Report, however, does not dwell on such likelihoods. The
report chooses to treat the reform of noneconomic damages as a problem
that involves only the curbing of excess damage awards, without con-
sidering that the conception of "reasonable award" may already incor-
porate amounts unrelated to noneconomic damage compensation as such.
It is a bit difficult to believe that the authors of the ABA Report
did not consider the collateral remedial functions of noneconomic damage
awards and the impact of damage caps on the conduct of plaintiffs'
litigation as they compiled their recommendations, yet the report was
silent on such matters. The commission cast its recommendations in a
form that assumes the basic validity of noneconomic damage awards
and addresses only the problem of invidious treatment of one subset of
those awards. The new damage cap statutes technically demand no more
of a response, for their effect is only to deny compensation for high
noneconomic losses and not to eliminate noneconomic damages alto-
gether. Nevertheless, the comments of the ABA Report were too narrowly
focused. They also evidenced a disinclination to take up the more difficult
remedy issues that would have been raised if the commission had explored
all sources of American society's willingness to compensate plaintiffs
for noneconomic damages at such generous levels. Such an exploration
would compel a discussion of the validity of generous compensation of
intangible injuries and an examination of the relationship between legal
fees, litigation costs, and intangible damage awards.
2. The Modest Possibilities for Future Tort Reform-A Partial
Explanation for the Staunch Defense of Noneconomic
Damages
It is somewhat speculative to suggest that the support of the ABA
Commission and of several state courts 9 for the preservation of non-
59. See, e.g., Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825, 836-37 (N.H. 1980); Smith v. De-
partment of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080, 1088-89 (Fla. 1987).
In common with the ABA Report, those court decisions which have declared uncon-
stitutional the restriction of nonpecuniary damage recoveries have not addressed the possible
links between generous nonpecuniary awards and the funding of plaintiffs' litigation.
Protection of the right to full compensation of nonpecuniary damages is viewed in these
cases simply as an element of the plaintiff's right to trial by jury and of full access to
the courts for redress of injuries, and it is relatively rare to find discussion of the collateral
remedy functions of noneconomic damages. See cases cited at supra note 9.
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pecuniary awards was motivated as much by a desire to preserve the
present remedy structure as by a principled commitment to nonpecuniary
awards as such. Ruling out such a possibility is nonetheless difficult.
The tort law revision movement is, after all, not a product of a wish
to propel the tort system to more rational plaintiffs' remedies that still
retain their basic effectiveness. 6° Rather, the movement has been con-
cerned with cost containment and litigation reduction, and has as part
of its underlying strategy making plaintiffs' cases less appealing to
plaintiffs' attorneys. 61 Thus, friends of plaintiffs' remedies may have
preferred to defend existing remedies instead of attempting to redirect
a hostile reform movement. Moreover, many of those engaged in the
60. See Rabin, supra note 17, at 15-23 (describing how the limited objectives of
recent tort reform and the narrow cost containment objectives on which the consensus
in favor of tort reform was based may circumscribe the types of further reforms that
can be hoped for).
61. The relationship between damage caps and the regulation of contingent fee con-
tracts, typical of the new revision statutes, illustrate this point well. Many tort reform
statutes include provisions meant to protect plaintiffs from oppressive contingent fee
arrangements. These provisions fall into two broad categories. There are those that set
maximums on contingent fee recoveries, often establishing schedules of maximum per-
centages of the plaintiff's gross recovery which can be charged as a contingent fee. This
approach may or may not be combined with a second type of provision which subjects
contingent fee arrangements to reasonableness inquiry, initiated either by the court or by
a party to the litigation. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-568 (sliding scale); Cal.
Bus. & Prof. Code § 6146; Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-251c (sliding scale); Del. Code
Ann., tit. 18, § 6865 (Supp. 1984); 1987 Ga. Laws 672 (plaintiff's attorney's fees capped
at 5001o of award); I11. Rev. Stat., ch. 110; Iowa Code Ann. § 147.138 (Supp. 1987);
Wash. Rev. Code Ann. 4.24.005 (1988) (establishing factors to be considered in computing
reasonable attorneys' fees).
Although these measures are clearly appropriate, since contingent fee arrangements may
be particularly prone to an absence of effective negotiation between lawyer and client,
see J. Auerbach, Unequal Justice 44-50 (1976) and Danzon, Contingent Fees for Personal
Injury Litigation, Rand Institute Study R-2458-HCFA, 26-29 (June, 1980), and open to
abuse by lawyers, these statutes address only the question of how the tort judgment or
settlement amount is to be allocated between lawyer and client, leaving untouched the
problem whether the total amount recoverable will provide adequately for the plaintiff's
losses and for the payment of reasonable expenses associated with the litigation. Where
maximum tort recoveries are restricted by damage caps and the abolition or modification
of the collateral source rule, the conflict between the provision of adequate net recovery
to the plaintiff and the payment of an adequate fee to counsel will be acute. In those
settings where presentation of the plaintiff's case will require substantial lawyer effort,
but where payment of a fee corresponding to that effort would seriously erode the plaintiff's
net recovery, courts will be subject to obvious new pressures to choose between the
lawyer's fee claim and the adequacy of the client's net recovery. The lawyer's willingness
to take cases where the risk of an inadequate fee award and expense allowance is real
will undoubtedly be affected. See supra note 36.
For an account of the process by which lawyers decide to accept litigation, see, e.g.,
Johnson, Lawyer's Choice: A Theoretical Appraisal of Litigation Investment Decisions,
15 Law & Society Rev. 567 (1980).
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current debate over tort reform have no interest in making fundamental
changes in the existing system, which serves them well even if it does
not serve the public well. 62 The system of general damage awards has
served the plaintiffs' bar well, and an effort to salvage that system may
seem at once less disruptive and more likely to enjoy success than
proposals for fundamental change. Neither the proponents of tort law
revision nor the advocates of unrestricted noneconomic damages have
taken the current ferment about tort reform as an opportunity to develop
a more integrated approach to the remedy issues raised by the ambiguous
role that noneconomic damage awards play in modern tort litigation.
This failure to discuss more forthrightly the relationship between the
generosity of American noneconomic damage awards and the funding
of litigation expenses has done a disservice to long-term reform of the
tort remedy structure.
III. ATTORNEYS' FEES As A SUBSTITUTE FOR NONECONOMIC DAMAGES
A. The Appropriateness of Economic Damages Together with
Attorneys' Fees as a Tort Remedy
Professor Jeffrey O'Connell is the most notable advocate of awarding
economic damages and attorneys' fees to prevailing plaintiffs in lieu of
economic and noneconomic damages. 63 In its basic form his proposal
would limit noneconomic recoveries to nominal amounts, 64 far below
the levels permitted by the damage caps typical of the recent round of
tort reform legislation. 65 Further, the proposal would permit full recovery
of all economic losses, including money damages suffered as an im-
mediate consequence of intangible injuries. 66 For example, lost earnings
62. See, e.g., Pierce, Institutional Aspects of Tort Reform, 73 Calif. L. Rev. 917,
918 (1985) (noting the existence of vested interests opposed to change).
63. O'Connell, supra note 3, at 333; See also Peck, supra note 40, at 1373-74.
64. O'Connell suggests a maximum amount of $10,000, resisting the temptation to
award generous nonpecuniary damages in cases of particularly severe injury on the ground
that full compensation of the economic consequences of such psychic injury is responsive
to the plaintiff's need and to a sense of fairness, and because drawing a line between
claims that do and do not merit compensation for intangible injury will tempt claimants
to pad their claims in marginal cases, cultivating psychic injuries. Supra note 3, at 351,
360-64.
65. See supra note 9 for typical damage cap amounts.
66. R. Keeton & J. O'Connell, supra note 4, at 285; J. O'Connell & R. Simon,
supra note 4, at 46-47.
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attributable to an inability to return to work because of psychological
disability would be recoverable, as would counselling expenses associated
with recovery from traumatic events. 67
The chief merit of this proposal is that it would establish a system
of tort remedies that openly addresses calculable losses rather than a
system that relies on the inexact and haphazard award of nonpecuniary
damages. Such a revised system would inspire confidence in the integrity
of damage awards and improve the accuracy of the awards themselves.
Under the proposal, money would be used as a means of compensating
plaintiffs for goods and services that have an independent market value
rather than as a solatium for injuries that cannot be redressed by the
payment of money. This section of the paper will describe how the
award of special damages together with attorneys' fees is more responsive
to the goals of victim compensation, deterrence of unjustified risk-
creation, and shifting of losses from victim to wrongdoer than is the
award of noneconomic damages. 6
1. The Unresponsiveness of Noneconomic Damages to Tort
Remedy Objectives
One of the principal objections raised against the limitation of tort
recoveries to economic losses is that the elimination of noneconomic
damages would insulate defendants from liability for a significant part
67. Id. O'Connell's basic proposal is reflected in lngber, supra note 29, at 782.
Professor Ingber's principal concern is the development of a more rational, less arbitrary
approach to the compensation of intangible injuries. Id. at 811. Examining the prevailing
rationales for the unrestricted award of damages for intangible injuries, Ingber ultimately
finds unpersuasive all explanations for unlimited nonpecuniary awards other than their
function as a source of general damages available for attorneys' fees and makeweight
compensation. He, like O'Connell, would restrict recovery for pain and suffering and
psychic injuries to economic ramifications of the harm done. Id. at 782.
The difficulties of proof of economic consequences of intangible injury should not be
underestimated, however. The causal link between economic loss and the psychic disruption
which is alleged to have produced the loss could be extremely elusive, and the existence
of such a link could prove as speculative as the existence of a link between intangible
injury and the amount of the dollar award intended to compensate the loss. Proof of
causation-in-fact could require intensive use of expert testimony to sort out psychic injuries
caused by the defendant from costs attributable to pre-existing psychological difficulties
to which the plaintiff may have already been subject. In addition to sorting out pre-
existing psychic injuries from injuries triggered by the defendant's conduct, there is the
problem whether later physical injuries which are possibly attributable to psychic harm
caused by the defendant are in fact the responsibility of the defendant or of some
independent cause. See, e.g., Fuller v. Preis, 35 N.Y.2d 425, 430, 434, 322 N.E.2d 263,
266, 268, 363 N.Y.S.2d 568, 573, 576 (1974). Fuller involves the difficult question whether
an accidental tort victim's subsequent suicide is to be attributed to trauma caused by the
tort.
68. O'Connell, supra note 3, at 354.
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of the harm caused, thereby frustrating the law's objectives of shifting
losses to the wrongdoer and of vindicating the plaintiff's right to be
free of psychic harm.69 In fact, noneconomic damages are less responsive
to core tort remedial objectives than is generally supposed. Nonecon-
omic damages are routinely excessive in cases where plaintiffs have
suffered relatively minor injuries70 and usually inadequate in cases where
plaintiffs have suffered truly catastrophic emotional and psychic inju-
ries. 7 1 This distortion occurs partly as a result of the strategic dynamics
of large claim and small claim tort litigation and partly as a result of
jury response to noneconomic damage claims.
In small claims litigation, where the award sought for pecuniary
losses is simply too small to support both the expenses of litigation and
an adequate net recovery for the plaintiff, the plaintiff's counsel is under
pressure to seek a total damage award that is sufficient to meet the
plaintiff's proven economic losses and to pay attorneys' fees. Those
pressures are particularly evident in the negotiation of settlements of
modest claims. In such cases, the defendant will often agree to pay
noneconomic damages that are large in relation to the nature of the
plaintiff's injury in order to induce the plaintiff to accept the settlement
offer. 72 For their part, the plaintiff's counsel and the plaintiff are willing
to accept such an offer because they will thereby be assured a net
recovery adequate to cover both the plaintiff's pecuniary losses and the
attorney's fees. The defendant is willing to tolerate this overpayment
69. For statements of the argument that complete loss-shifting requires the compen-
sation of noneconomic damages, see, e.g., Bell, The Bell Tolls: Toward Full Tort Recovery
for Psychic Injury, 36 U. Fla. L. Rev. 333 (1984); Phillips, To Be or Not to Be: Reflections
on Changing Our Tort System, 46 Md. L. Rev. 55, 60 (1986). See also Ingber, supra
note 29, at 773, 781.
70. See, e.g., O'Connell & Simon, supra note 4, at 6; Ingber, supra note 29, at 804-
05.
The phenomenon of systematic overcompensation and undercompensation of tort claims
for both economic and noneconomic damages has been a matter of frequent comment.
One GAO study showed that in medical malpractice actions, plaintiffs whose economic
damages exceeded $100,000 received less than that amount in settlement or damages while
those whose economic losses were less than $50,000 often received payments substantially
greater than their actual losses. U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Medical Malpractice: Char-
acteristics of Claims Closed in 1984, at 44-45 (GAO/HRD-87-55, Apr. 1987). Similar
observations have been made with respect to automobile accident tort claims. See Franklin,
A Symposium in Honor of Charles D. Gregory-Replacing the Negligence Lottery: Com-
pensation and Selective Reimbursement, 53 Va. L. Rev. 774, 780 (1967).
71. Id. "If there is one thing which the surveys have shown conclusively," reported
Professor Alfred Conard, "it is that the tort system overpays the small claimants who
need it least, and underpays the large claimants who need it most." Conard, Testimony
Before the New York Joint Legislative Committee on Insurance Rates and Regulations,
U. Mich. L. Quadrangle Notes at 15 (Fall 1970).
72. See, e.g., J. Fleming, supra note 56, at 211; O'Connell, supra note 3, at 340,
359 (citing H. Ross, Settled Out of Court 230 (1970)); Ingber, supra note 29, at 304.
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because the absolute dollar amounts are small enough to make some
overpayment acceptable as a price of prompt settlement." This is es-
pecially true where, as is often the case with smaller claims, the defen-
dant's liability insurance policy is adequate to allow settlement of the
claim within policy limits.
Conversely, in cases where large noneconomic damages are sought,
undercompensation is typical. Part of the reason for this undercom-
pensation is that the high stakes of litigation cause defendants to resist
settlement and to protract the conduct of litigation, even when they
face plaintiffs with strong cases. A strategy of resistance may exhaust
the plaintiff and help to force a more advantageous settlement. 74 More-
over, very few insurance policies will cover the claims involved in such
large dollar cases. Unless the defendant is a competent self-insurer, it
can be expected to resist a settlement that exceeds its insurance policy
limits, thereby compelling the plaintiff who has suffered serious injury
to settle for an inadequate amount or to proceed to trial in hopes of
obtaining a judgment or coaxing the defendant to extend a revised
settlement offer more responsive to its losses.
The ability of noneconomic damage awards to meet the full extent
of plaintiffs' needs is further undercut by the simple unwillingness of
factfinders to make large awards for intangible injuries. Factfinders,
when considering whether to award substantial noneconomic damages,
often seem to be constrained by the feeling that the requested award
is simply too large, however justified the award may seem under a
scheme that calls for progressively larger recoveries for progressively
graver injuries. 75 This constraint imposes a very real, but altogether
uncertain, practical upper limit on noneconomic damages recoveries.
Because there is such an uncertain limit on recovery, noneconomic
73. O'Connell, supra note 3, at 340.
74. National Ass'n of Ins. Comm'rs, Automobile Insurance Study Background Mem-
orandum, in Report of the Special Committee on Automobile Insurance Problems 99-100
(1969):
Those who have suffered injuries in automobiles know that prompt payment
of compensation is rare, and that the gap between loss and compensation is
vast. ...
The long delays, characteristic of this system, produce a cruel injustice that
strikes harder as injuries are more severe. A hard bargaining insurance company
can buy the claim of such a person with a penurious settlement offer that
capitalizes on his pressing needs in face of a long wait for trial.
Investigation of Auto Insurance: Hearings on S.J. Res. 129 Before the Consumer Subcomm.
of the Comm. on Commerce, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 180-81 (1968) (statement of the
Executive Board of Communications Workers of America), cited in Ingber, supra note
29, at 804 n.155.
75. See supra note 20 for evidence of jury restraint in making noneconomic damage
awards.
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damages do function reliably to achieve full compensation or the proper
measure of deferrence. The uncertainty introduced into noneconomic
damages awards as a result of this constraint may deter worthwhile
litigation and may affect the plaintiffs' counsel's trial strategy. This is
so because of the effect of noneconomic damages on the amount of
effort that the plaintiff's counsel will be willing to invest in a lawsuit
and on the capacity of the total damage award to meet pecuniary losses,
attorneys' fees, and other legal expenses.7 6
2. The Suitability of Attorneys' Fee Awards as a Substitute for
Noneconomic Damages
The award of reasonable attorneys' fees would offer a number of
advantages over noneconomic damage awards. First, with respect to
cases involving small claims, the award of reasonable attorneys' fees,
combined with economic damages, would avoid dependency on contrived
noneconomic damage claims. 77 Further, widespread knowledge that dam-
age awards are not necessarily and systematically bloated to provide
additional compensation would contribute to public confidence in the
integrity of damage settlements and judgments. Second, with respect to
cases involving large claims, awards of attorneys' fees could be more
effective than noneconomic damage awards at causing defendants to
move promptly towards reasonable settlements. Unreasonable delays could
result in increased plaintiff's legal fees, placing a premium on prompt
resolution of disputes and attaching a cost to unreasonable delay.7 s By
contrast, noneconomic damages are not normally increased as a result
of delays in settlement or of protracted litigation. 79 Another advantage
of awarding attorneys' fees rather than noneconomic damages in large
claim cases is that such awards could reduce defendants' strategic re-
sistance to settlement proposals. It is far more likely that an early
settlement offer consisting of reasonable attorneys' fees and economic
damages would lie within the defendant's policy coverage limits than
would a settlement proposal that incorporated a large "opening offer"
claim for noneconomic damages. The greater likelihood that its insurer
could pay the damages in a promptly settled case would promote earlier
settlement, especially by solvent defendants, who could thereby avoid
76. See discussion in supra note 36, describing relationship of lawyer effort to the
earning potential of the case; see also O'Connell, supra note 3, at 359 (citing H. Ross,
Settled Out of Court 230 (1970)).
77. O'Connell, supra note 3, at 354.
78. See Rowe, Predicting the Effects of Attorney Fee Shifting, 47 Law & Contemp.
Probs. 139, 161-62 (1984).
79. Except in the most outrageous cases of abusive litigation tactics. See, e.g., Crisci
v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
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exposing other assets to the costs of protracted litigation. The incentive
to resist plaintiffs' settlement offers that include large "opening offer"
noneconomic damage claims would therefore be eliminated.
The award of attorneys' fees in place of noneconomic damages will
not eliminate all downward pressure on plaintiffs' recoveries. When the
claim for proven special damages substantially exceeds the defendant's
policy limits, the defendant will continue to resist any settlement beyond
those limits. Furthermore, the pressure to settle promptly, which is
created by the defendant's obligation to pay the plaintiff's ever-increasing
legal fees, may be less effective in a case where the plaintiff's special
damages are large enough to create an independent reason to resist
settlement or where the bulk of the plaintiff's counsel's work is completed
relatively early in the litigation. In these settings, the risk that the
defendant might have to pay an additional amount for the plaintiff's
counsel's courtroom work may seem worth taking if further resistance
to settlement is likely to move the plaintiff to settle for a sure, but
lesser, amount instead of testing his case at trial. Thus, the award of
attorneys' fees will not overcome strategic resistance to settlements for
amounts exceeding insured liability, but will be effective in removing
the barriers to settlement that are peculiar to noneconomic damage
awards. 80
In addition to promoting prompt, just settlements of strong plain-
tiffs' claims, attorneys' fee awards are consistent with the deterrence
and loss-shifting goals of the tort system. Fees, together with proven
economic damages, would constitute a remedy that is fully responsive
to the plaintiff's quantifiable losses. By shifting to the defendant all
substantial economic losses caused by its wrong, this remedy would also
signal strongly the legal system's commitment to protecting the plaintiff's
right to be free of the injury suffered.8' Although the proposed scheme
would force plaintiffs to forgo receiving substantial compensation of
noneconomic damages, the reasonable fee award would provide more
reliable compensation of fixed and ascertained losses than the uncertain
80. Even though defendants would probably still negotiate large plaintiffs' claims
downward, such settlement negotiations would be grounded on claims for reasonable fees
and provable special damages. This development would narrow the range of competing
settlement proposals and provide a sounder foundation for compromise.
81. One commentator has raised the question whether abandoning noneconomic dam-
age awards might signal indifference by the legal system to psychic injuries. He concludes
that the compensation of the economic consequences of an intangible injury would give
an adequate signal of the law's solicitousness and that abandonment of damages for the
intangible part of the harm might actually diminish psychic and psychosomatic injuries
by discouraging morbid absorption in one's own aggrievement. Ingber, supra note 29, at
799-808. See also O'Connell, supra note 3, at 337-39, describing how plaintiffs are
encouraged by litigation to develop an acute sensitivity to their pain and suffering.
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award of noneconomic damages. s2 Further, certain recovery for quan-
tifiable losses would provide as much, if not more, compensation and
deterrence as that accomplished by the fitful award of noneconomic
damages .83
Despite these advantages of attorneys' fee awards, the use of such
awards is not unproblematic. First, there is the troublesome problem of
arriving at a structure for attorney fee shifting that will not meet with
the reflexive opposition of plaintiffs' or of defendants' groups. Second,
a system of attorneys' fee awards faces several administrative problems,
for example, the possibility that routine fee awards will prompt nuisance
litigation14 and the danger that attorneys will put forward overstated
claims, the review of which might impose a significant administrative
burden on the tort system. 85 In the next section of the article, these
problems will be explored in detail.
B. The Features of a Fee Shifting System Appropriate For Common
Law Tort Litigation
Two principal commentators have analyzed the compatability of
attorney fee awards with the conduct of tort litigation. Philip Mause,86
and, more recently and more comprehensively, Thomas Rowe, Jr.,8 7
have analyzed the effects of various approaches to fee awards on such
82. See supra note 7 and M. Peterson, Civil Juries in the 1980's: Trend in Jury
Trials and Verdicts in California and Cook County, Illinois 21, 32-34 (RAND R-3466-
ICJ, 1987). This study describes the "negligence lottery" phenomenon which causes some
plaintiffs to recover disproportionately generous awards while others go wholly uncom-
pensated or receive amounts far less than their proven special damages. "Big verdicts"
in only sixty-seven cases accounted for eighty-five percent of all plaintiffs' medical mal-
practice awards in Cook County during the four-year period of the study (1980-84). See
also J. O'Connell, The Lawsuit Lottery (1979).
83. Cf. supra note 81.
84. See Rowe, supra note 78, at 150; Wolfram, The Second Set of Players: Lawyers,
Fee Shifting and the Limits of Professional Discipline, 47 Law & Contemp. Probs. 293
(1984). The American Rule creates similar incentives for nuisance litigation, though, as
Professor Rowe observes, the explicitly encouraging climate of a one-way prevailing plaintiff
rule might increase marginally such nuisance litigation. The discouragement of abusive
recourse to litigation in a one-way fee-shifting system is discussed in the text accompanying
infra notes 124-26, 130-33.
85. See Breger, Compensation Formulas for Court-Awarded Attorneys Fees, 47 Law
& Contemp. Probs. 249 (1984) (calculation of fees); Dobbs, Awarding Attorney Fees
Against Adversaries: Introducing the Problem, 1986 Duke L.J. 435, 462-89 (difficulty of
calculating fees); Wolfram, supra note 84 (generally on necessity of policing lawyer
misconduct).
86. Mause, Winner Takes All: A Re-Examination of the Indemnity System, 55 Iowa
L. Rev. 26 (1969-70).
87. Rowe, supra note 78; Rowe, The Legal Theory of Fee Shifting: A Critical
Overview, 1982 Duke L.J. 651 (hereinafter Rowe, The Legal Theory].
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matters as the encouragement of well-founded litigation, the discour-
agement of spurious suits, and the promotion of fair settlements. This
work was stimulated in part by a wish to test the soundness of persistent
suggestions that a prevailing-party system of fee awards be substituted
for the American Rule of no fee awards in tort litigation. 8 More recently,
exploration of how fee shifting systems might operate in untried areas
of litigation has been stimulated by the adoption of many new state
and federal fee shifting statutes. 9 The proliferation of these fee shifting
statutes has raised new doubts about the appropriateness of the American
Rule as the universal approach to payment of fees in litigation, and
intensified the search for alternatives to the practice of making each
litigant responsible for his own fees. 90 What is most valuable in this
88. While the two-way indemnity rule is perhaps the most familiar alternative to the
existing American Rule, and has been continually advocated in some quarters as suitable
for general application in American litigation, see, e.g., Greenberger, The Cost of Justice:
An American Problem, An English Solution, 9 Vill. L. Rev. 400 (1964); Kuenzel, The
Attorney's Fee: Why Not a Cost of Litigation?, 49 Iowa L. Rev. 75 (1963); Lyman, Our
Obsolete System of Taxable Costs, 25 Conn. B. J. 148 (1951); McCormick, Counsel Fees
and Other Expenses of Litigation as an Element of Damages, 15 Minn. L. Rev. 619
(1931); Stoebuck, Counsel Fees Included in Costs: A Logical Development, 38 Colo. L.
Rev. 202 (1966); Talmadge, The Award of Attorneys' Fees in Civil Litigation in Wash-
ington, 16 Gonz. L. Rev. 57 (1980-81), two-way indemnity has received little legislative
support. See, however, as an example of a two-way fee-shifting statute applicable to tort
litigations, Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 4.84.250 (1988), which provides that in any action
where the damages pleaded, exclusive of costs, is $10,000 or less, the prevailing party
shall be allowed reasonable attorneys fees, as determined by the court. The decided
inclination, however, is towards prevailing plaintiff rules. Note, State Attorney Fee Shifting
Statutes: Are We Quietly Repealing the American Rule?, 47 Law & Contemp. Probs. 321
(1984).
Most early fee shifting proposals assumed the necessity or desirability of treating vic-
torious plaintiffs and victorious defendants alike in awarding each its fees. The claimed
benefits of this scheme include the discouragement of frivolous lawsuits, the alleviation
of court congestion through the creation of powerful incentives to settle rather than to
litigate, the just treatment of vindicated plaintiffs and defendants by making them fi-
nancially whole by paying their legal expenses, and the encouragement of meritorious
lawsuits which do not involve money damages adequate to fund attorneys' fees under a
contingent fee arrangement. See, e.g., Mause, supra note 86, at 26-27. These benefits are
won at the cost of discouraging good faith plaintiffs' suits where chances of victory are
uncertain. See discussion accompanying infra notes 94-96.
89. Federal and state civil rights statutes, environmental protection legislation, con-
sumer protection acts, and a wide array of other state acts involving quite mundane
interests award prevailing plaintiffs their legal fees. For a description of the many fee
shifting acts and discussion of their underlying rationales, see, e.g., Fein, Citizen Suit
Attorney Fee Shifting Awards: A Critical Examination of Government-"Subsidized" Lit-
igation, 47 Law & Contemp. Probs. 211 (1984), Zemans, Fee Shifting and the Imple-
mentation of Public Policy, 47 Law & Contemp. Probs. 187 (1984); Note, supra note
88.
90. The collection of articles appearing in Volume 49 of Law & Contemporary
Problems is indicative of the heightened interest in fee shifting schemes.
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work is its insistence on the need for refined analysis of the effect of
specific fee award practices on the conduct of litigation. The central
observation of the studies is that a given fee award scheme will not be
appropriate unless it is consistent with the core objectives of the type
of litigation where it is applied. 9
For example, an essential characteristic of the American tort litigation
system, one that is relevant to the choice of an appropriate fee shifting
system for personal injury litigation, is its strong preference in favor
of unencumbered access to remedies by good faith plaintiffs. 92 The
American tort system is designed to compensate injuries and to reduce
the risk of injuries caused by legally responsible actors. To accomplish
these goals, the system must encourage plaintiffs' actions that may prove
to be unsuccessful. Otherwise, the continual testing and evolution of
tort duties, which the system values, will be frustrated. These goals-
compensation and deterrence-thus operate as a limiting factor, defining
the range of acceptable fee shifting systems. Although a satisfactory fee
shifting system must include some mechanism for promoting just set-
tlements, deterring frivolous claims, and eliminating abusive trial tactics
by plaintiffs and defendants alike, the system should accomplish these
goals in a way that allows the plaintiff to undertake good faith litigation
of uncertain outcome. 93 The identification of this core concern permits
a fairer appraisal of the responsiveness of various fee shifting systems
to the objectives of tort litigation.
1. The Unsuitability of Two- Way Indemnity Fee Shifting
The nature of the core objectives of the torts system means that a
true, two-way indemnity fee awards system cannot be tolerated. It is
incompatible with the policy of affording good faith plaintiffs unen-
cumbered access to the civil remedy system.94 In the absence of insti-
tutional arrangements allowing plaintiffs of lesser means to avoid fee
91. Rowe, supra note 78, at 144.
92. This preference for the encouragement of plaintiffs' actions is the principal reason
why a common argument in favor of two-way fee shifting-that it is fair that the party
whose legal action or defense has prevailed should not suffer the financial burdens of its
successful action or defense-is not a winning argument. The claim for equality of treatment
of plaintiffs and defendants must be reconciled with the objective of not deterring access
by good faith plaintiffs to the remedy system. See Rowe, The Legal Theory, supra note
87, at 654.
93. Id.
94. The United States Supreme Court has commented favorably on the American
policy of encouraging or accommodating litigation and the vindication of rights through
the contingent fee system. This policy was construed with that promoted by the English
Rule, which, by imposing what may prove crushing costs of litigation on the losing party,
discourages access to the courts. See Farmer v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 379 U.S. 227, 237,
85 . Ct. 411, 417 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
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indemnity obligations in unsuccessful litigation, two-way fee shifting
could deter such plaintiffs from bringing meritorious claims of uncertain
outcome95 by exposing them to the risk of having to pay the defendant's
legal fees. 96 Even commentators who have favored substitution of a two-
way rule for the present American Rule have acknowledged that adequate
access to the tort system would be frustrated by a pure two-way rule, 97
and have suggested that the courts be given discretion to forgive the
fee obligations of losing plaintiffs in appropriate cases. 9s
The incompatibility of two-way fee shifting with the objects of tort
litigation is also shown by that scheme's effects on the settlement of
cases. The obligation of the losing party to pay the winning party's
expenses is said to discourage unreasonable suits, unreasonable refusals
to settle, and unreasonable delays in settlement by plaintiffs and de-
fendants alike. The result is purportedly produced by compelling the
losing party to pay the expenses suffered by the prevailing party as a
result of the loser's unreasonable tactics. 99 The weakness in this argument
is that by granting indemnity to the party who succeeds on the merits,
losers are penalized simply for having lost, no matter how sound their
decision to litigate or to resist settlement may have been.
There will be cases involving novel theories of liability where the
measure of appropriate compensation is untested, and plaintiffs should
not invariably be deterred from testing the adequacy of settlement offers.
Nor should the plaintiff's failure to obtain a damage award at trial that
is as large as a proffered settlement amount establish, without more,
the defendant's right to fee indemnification.' °°
95. See e.g., Mause, supra note 86, at 36; Rowe, supra note 78, at 153-54.
96. See, e.g., Corboy, Contingency Fees: The Individual's Key to the Courthouse
Door, 2 Litig. 27 (Summer 1976).
97. See, e.g., Mause, supra note 86, at 46-50; Talmadge, supra note 88, at 71-72.
98. Id. One difficulty with these proposals for mitigation is that they either depend
on the application of awkward tests requiring that the plaintiff show that its losing case
has advanced some significant public interest, or seem to abandon two-way fee shifting
altogether in favor of a de facto rule in which winning plaintiffs are awarded their fees
routinely and losing plaintiffs are rarely assessed the fees of prevailing defendants. A
further difficulty of any but the most clearly stated of mitigation rules is that plaintiffs
would have to await the result of the litigation and a judicial ruling on fee awards before
knowing whether their unsuccessful litigation would create fee obligations. The uncertainty
created by any such discretionary rule could itself discourage good faith litigation. More-
over, the "public interest" ground for mitigation would not, unless permissively interpreted,
protect the undertaking of good faith garden variety lawsuits where no public interest
existed. New and significant risks would affect the decision to undertake ordinary claims
where the chance for success was good but not certain.
99. Rowe, supra note 78, at 154-61.
100. For identical reasons, offer of judgment rules, assessing the settlement offeror's
costs and fees to an offeree who declines the offered amount and who subsequently fails
to obtain a judgment as large as the offered amount, are intended to promote settlements,
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Moreover, the need for fee indemnity as an incentive to curb plain-
tiffs' tactical behavior has been exaggerated. Even when a losing plaintiff
is not threatened with the prospect of paying the fees of a prevailing
defendant, there remains the risk that loss on the merits will cost the
client his remedy and the lawyer his fee. These risks provide powerful
incentives for plaintiffs and their counsel to accept fair settlements.
Similarly, the initial decision to litigate is not without risk for the plaintiff
and counsel, even under the American Rule."° If the additional sanction
of fee indemnity is needed to deal with cases of frivolous litigation and
oppressive conduct by plaintiffs' counsel, the sanction should, at a
minimum, be narrowly focused on such abusive cases alone. Blanket
application of a fee indemnity rule will thus create inappropriate pressures
to settle rather than litigate even sound plaintiffs' cases, even where a
defense settlement offer seems inadequate and should be tested at trial.
The risks of litigating rather than settling even a strong case are com-
paratively great, and the additional threat of paying prevailing party
fees in all cases of loss, or of failure to obtain at trial an award as
great as an earlier settlement offer, would unduly burden plaintiffs' trial
decisions.
True two-way indemnity weighs as heavily on good faith refusals
to settle as it does on unreasonable refusals to settle. A fee shifting
system must be more discriminating than that scheme in its effects on
different classes of unsuccessful plaintiffs. So long as the tort system
employs the private legal action as an important tool for remedying
injury and for creating legal duties that serve the public interest, 0 2 that
but may place undesirable pressures on the parties. Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure is the best known offer-of-judgment rule and there exist similar state rules.
See, e.g., Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 4.84.250-300 (1988) (offer of judgment device
applicable in cases involving damages of $10,000 or less). The risk to plaintiffs is that
defendants will use the device to make an unacceptably low settlement offer, expecting
that the plaintiff will refuse, and hoping to defeat the plaintiff on the merits or to exhaust
him in litigation. See Note, Rule 68: A "New" Tool for Litigation, 1978 Duke L.J. 889.
If offer of judgment devices become typical features of American tort litigation, they
should be structured in a manner that distinguishes abusive refusals to settle from good
faith testing of the adequacy of settlement offers. See, e.g., Preliminary Draft of Proposed
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 98 F.R.D. 337, 362-63 (1983), which
would have granted discretion to courts to deny costs, expenses and interests to an offeror
whose offer the court determined to have been made in bad faith. This provision was
not reflected in the 1987 amendments to Rule 68, which are technical and effect no
substantive changes. 7 Moore's Federal Practice 68.01 (1988).
101. The expense associated with discovery and trial preparation is a significant im-
pediment to foundationless claims. It has frequently been noted that the self-interest of
plaintiffs' counsel is an effective screen for claims with a low likelihood of success.
102. Although the need to provide adequate compensation through the tort system has
been diminished somewhat by the increasing availability of disability benefits to compensate
for injuries, Sugarman, Doing Away With Tort Law, 73 Calif. L. Rev. 555 (1985), such
benefits are not sufficiently universal to permit an atrophying of effective tort remedies.
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system must subordinate the defendant's right to fee indemnification to
the need to maintain the plaintiff's free access to the tort system.
The conflict between one-way and two-way fee shifting as competing
legitimate models appropriate to tort litigation is thus a false conflict. 03
The notion that the clash of the defendant's interest in equal treatment
and the plaintiff's interest in unencumbered access creates a genuine
impasse depends upon the false view that the policy arguments for
vindicating each of the two interests are of equal stature. This impasse
can be overcome by focusing on the central objectives of tort litigation.2 4
2. Prevailing Plaintiff Fee Awards as an Alternative to the
American Rule
A prevailing plaintiff fee shifting system, more so than either a two-
way indemnity fee shifting system or the American Rule, would reconcile
the dual objectives of promoting plaintiffs' access to the torts system
and protecting defendants from unjustified claims. Plaintiffs suing under
a one-way system would be able, as under the American Rule, to pursue
reasonable theories of recovery, free of the threat that fee indemnification
obligations would arise from the mere failure of a lawsuit. 05 However,
the inclusion of a definite attorneys' fee award as an integral part of
the tort remedy would encourage the bringing of strong claims, large
and small, to a greater extent than would the American Rule, and therefore
would eliminate reliance on contrived noneconomic damage claims to
make suits worthwhile. For defendants, especially in routine uncontested
liability cases, the payment of reasonable attorneys' fees could often
cost less than the payment of the inflated noneconomic damages that
are now exacted as a cost of settlement of such claims. Such uncontested
liability claims could be especially amenable to the development of
relatively firm judicial guidelines fixing modest but adequate fees.
There might well be an increase in the number of cases brought,
since the general availability of fees would encourage certain classes of
litigation that are discouraged under the American Rule. Strong plain-
tiffs' cases that require extensive trial preparation but that involve modest
103. See Rowe, The Legal Theory, supra note 87, at 666.
104. Id.
105. One-way fee awards in favor of prevailing defendants is another conceivable form
of fee shifting. To justify pro-defendant fee shifting, there must exist either (i) a sufficient
bias against all plaintiffs litigation that one wishes not only to encourage successful defense
efforts but to provide no encouragement to successful plaintiffs who establish violations
of tort duties; or (ii) a belief that the relative economic positions of defendants and
plaintiffs is so disparate and that defendants are so disadvantaged that they should be
protected from the obligation to pay the fees of winning plaintiffs, and should be entitled
to their own fees when they win. The bias of such a system seems wholly at odds with
the present dynamics of personal injury litigation. See Rowe, supra note 78, at 141.
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dollar claims are presently discouraged under the American Rule. The
expected recovery will simply not support the costs of litigation of such
cases. The award of attorneys' fees not only would encourage the filing
of such actions, but also would foster their prompt settlement. Rea-
sonable legal fees for preparation of such a case for trial could well
be substantially greater than the damages at issue; thus, settlement would
be the better course for, the defendant who thinks he is likely to be
held liable.
An increase in the attractiveness of certain plaintiffs' actions will
plainly not advance defendants' interests, but is consistent with the goal
of accomodating the legitimate interests of plaintiffs and defendants.
The defendant's right is defined not as the right to be free from suit,
for in a system where liability rules are not fixed, testing of liability
rules through plaintiffs' suits involves no legal wrong and provides the
mechanism for establishing general tort duties. The defendant's right in
this setting is instead the right to be free of plaintiffs' abusive litigation. 10 6
The plaintiff's corresponding right is the right of full good faith access
to the remedy system in order to test proposed theories of recovery. 07
The prevailing plaintiff rule, grounded on a rationale of full recourse
to compensation for legal injury, permits plaintiffs the free access to
remedies that the tort system has valued, but contains its own limiting
principle, namely, the protection of defendants against abusive litigation.
Because the protection of defendants from intolerable liability has
dominated recent tort reform efforts, a prevailing party fee shifting
scheme, modified to accommodate some losing plaintiffs' actions, might
be more intuitively appealing to many legislators than would a prevailing
plaintiff system. This is so because a prevailing plaintiff system, even
if accompanied by the elimination of noneconomic damage awards and
by the implementation of sanctions to deter frivolous and abusive plain-
tiffs' suits,'10 would seem in the eyes of many to treat defendants unfairly,
to accord plaintiffs a favored status,' °9 and to institutionalize the role
of plaintiffs' counsel in obtaining tort remedies." 0 Although a two-way
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. The risk of abusive recourse to litigation has been identified as a particular
disadvantage of prevailing plaintiff fee shifting. Accordingly, the need for effective sanc-
tions to discourage spurious litigation stimulated by the prospect of a fee award is viewed
as an essential component of an effective prevailing plaintiff fee shifting system. See
Rowe, supra note 78, at 147.
109. Rowe, The Legal Theory, supra note 87, at 657-59. Professor Dan Dobbs has
taken exception to the "prejudicial" treatment of defendants flowing from one-way
prevailing plaintiff fee shifting. See Dobbs, supra note 85, at 445.
110. Interestingly, opposition to the possible institutionalization of plaintiffs' counsels'
role as gatekeeper to the remedy system by awarding fees to successful litigants could
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fee shifting system could be modified to excuse good faith losing plain-
tiffs from fee indemnity obligations,"' a prevailing plaintiff rule fits
more naturally with the objectives of American tort law and, unlike
two-way indemnity fee shifting, requires no distortion of its fundamental
assumptions to permit fee awards to all prevailing plaintiffs but not all
prevailing defendants. Two-way indemnity systems rest upon the as-
sumption that prevailing plaintiffs and prevailing defendants have an
equal entitlement, as winners, to compensation for the expenses of
successful litigation. The injury-compensation orientation of modern
American tort law, however, is at odds with this assumption and supplies
a rationale for distinguishing between winning plaintiffs' fee claims and
winning defendants' fee claims.
Prevailing plaintiff fee shifting is common, though, where there is
a strongly perceived interest in promoting plaintiffs' good faith litigation,
as is the case with litigation brought under consumer protection or civil
rights statutes." 2 The public interest in promoting products liability and
common law negligence litigation is strong, because such litigation has
led to safer products and conduct and because compensation for accident
injuries in our society continues to depend on giving plaintiffs ready
access to tort remedies. Although the present willingness of legislatures
to adopt a prevailing plaintiff system must seem doubtful, the limited
focus of recent tort law revisions and their preference for restricting
remedies should not be allowed to define the course of future reforms.
7-
come from elements of the plaintiffs' bar as well as from the defense bar. Routine fee
awards, subject to judicial review and removed from the realm of private ordering, would
make the compensation of plaintiffs' attorneys a more integral part of the administration
of tort claims and might cause a significant alteration in the plaintiffs' attorneys' self-
conception as an independent actor. See infra text at notes 124-26, 131-33.
To the extent that the plaintiffs' bar believes itself to have been well-served by a system
where fee awards have come from the plaintiff's damages, the relative loss of independence
resulting from intense judicial scrutiny of fee claims may seem an undesirable sacrifice.
111. See Rowe, The Legal Theory, supra note 87, at 657-58; Mause, supra note 86,
at 30.
112. Three-fourths of the fee shifting statutes specifically applicable to consumer lit-
igation are prevailing plaintiff statutes as are seventy-nine percent of the antitrust fee
shifting statutes. Note, supra note 88, at 329-31.
A recent nationwide survey of state attorney fee shifting statutes has discovered that
fifty-four percent of the 1,974 statutes identified as mandatory fee shifting statutes among
the 4,000-5,000 statutes surveyed, designated the prevailing plaintiff as the beneficiary of
the statute, while nineteen percent of the statutes designated the prevailing party as the
beneficiary and only 8.4 percent identified the prevailing defendant as the beneficiary.
Id. at 330-31. The author views these findings as particularly significant because they
indicate that the states, in developing alternatives to the American Rule, have not embraced
the English rule of general indemnity, but have instead sought to encourage litigation by
individuals and consumers. Id.
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3. Administration of a Fee Shifting System
In developing an attorney fee award system, legislatures may draw
upon the accumulated experience of awarding attorneys' fees under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act" 3 and other state and federal statutes
authorizing such awards." 4 Existing fee shifting systems have struggled
both with the problem of setting appropriate fee awards and with
regulating the conduct of lawyers tempted to abuse the fee award process.
The chief difficulties have occurred in establishing and applying criteria
for the reasonableness of fee awards, in verifying specific fee claims,
and in addressing conflicts of interest that arise between lawyer and
client in dividing settlement amounts between damages and fees.
Regarding the setting of reasonable fee awards, the effort by the
Supreme Court to prescribe, and of the lower federal courts to apply,
methods for calculating legal fees for purposes of Title VII litigation
indicates that fee awards may be difficult to set and may themselves
become the subject of continuing litigation. Using the basic calculation
developed by the Supreme Court in Hensley v. Eckerhart,"5 the trial
court arrives at a reasonable fee, referred to as a "lodestar" fee award,
by multiplying reasonable hours by a reasonable rate. The court may
then make discretionary adjustments to this basic calculation to reflect
the relative success or failure of the litigation in realizing the plaintiff's
113. The relevant portion of The Civil Rights Attorneys Fees Awards Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988 (1976) states:
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1982, 1983,
1985, and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public Law 92-318, or title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing
party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the
costs.
The legislative objectives of section 1988 support and subsequent court interpretation
of the section has confirmed, the appropriateness of treating prevailing plaintiffs far more
favorably than prevailing defendants in the exercise of judicial discretion to make fee
awards. Prevailing plaintiffs promote statutory objectives by bringing civil rights actions,
while the award of fees against them would chill their willingness to bring such actions.
Accordingly, defendants rarely are awarded attorneys' fees in civil rights suits, while
awards to prevailing plaintiffs are commonly made, unless a court finds that "special
circumstances" would make the award unjust. For a discussion of the development in
the case law of standards to be applied in making fee award decisions under section
1988, see Comment, Attorneys' Fees in Civil Rights Cases: Contingent Fee Awards Under
Section 1988, 17 Pac. L.J. 1275, 1281-83 (1986), and, generally, on interpretive issues
under section 1988, Note, Surveying the Law of Fee Awards Under the Attorney's Fees
Awards Act of 1976, 59 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1293 (1984).
114. See Fein, supra note 89; Percival & Miller, The Role of Attorney Fee Shifting
in Public Interest Litigation, 47 Law & Contemp. Probs. 233 (1984); Zemans, supra note
89; and Note, supra note 88, for descriptions of the proliferation and the objects of fee
shifting statutes.
115. 461 U.S. 424, 103 S. Ct. 1933 (1983).
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objectives. In making these discretionary adjustments, the Hensley Court
suggested, courts should continue to look to the factors enumerated by
the Fifth Circuit in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express," 6 factors that
the sponsors of Title VII suggested should be used in setting fee awards." 7
The Johnson factors, which closely correspond to the factors enumerated
in codes of professional conduct,"' include the following: time and labor
expended by counsel, the novelty and difficulty of the case, the particular
skill of the attorney, any preclusive effect the case might have had on
counsel's ability to take other cases, the attorney's customary fee, the
contingent nature of the fee award, any unusual time limitation imposed
by the litigant, the amount of money involved and the nature of the
relief sought in the case, the experience and reputation of counsel, any
undesirability in being associated with the case, the length of the re-
lationship between attorney and client, and the fees paid in similar
cases."19
Hensley's invitation to trial courts to make discretionary adjustments
of the basic "lodestar" calculation has produced the greatest uncertainty
in setting fee awards. In Blum v. Stetson 20 the Court attempted to
return the calculation of reasonable fees to a more objective basis,
emphasizing that fee enhancements over and above lodester amounts
should normally not be expected.' 2' Nonetheless, because the Court in
Blum indicated that computation of the basic lodestar amount, based
on a reasonable hourly rate and a reasonable number of hours worked,
should take into account any special value of the services provided, 22
the courts have simply shifted the consideration of subjective factors to
computation of the basic lodestar fee. 23
Despite the difficulties of calculating reasonable fees, most legislation
providing for counsel fee awards is similar to Title VII and therefore
leaves with the courts the burden of case-by-case determination of fee
116. 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974).
117. See Senate Rep. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.
Code, Cong. & Ad. News 5908-14; and Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433-34, 103 S. Ct. at 1939.
118. See Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 2-106 (B) (1979) and ABA
Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.5(a) (1983).
119. Two elements of the Johnson factors, the undesirability of the case and the
amount of fees awarded in similar cases, are not listed among the criteria for reasonable
fee awards set out in the Model Rules. See ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct
Rule 1.5(a) (1983).
120. 465 U.S. 886, 104 S. Ct. 1541 (1984).
121. Id. at 896-97, 104 S. Ct. at 1548.
122. Id. at 898, 104 S. Ct. at 1548-1549.
123. See, e.g., Jordan v: Multnomah Co., 815 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1987); Greater
L.A. Council on Deafness v. Community Television of S. California, 813 F.2d 217, 221
(9th Cir. 1987); Nisby v. Commissioners Court of Jefferson Co., 798 F.2d 134, 137 (5th
Cir. 1986).
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awards.124 The prevalence of this statutory approach suggests that case-
by-case fee setting does not present unsolvable administrative problems,
as indeed it does not. 2 Even some recent tort reform statutes incorporate
provisions for the review of contingent fee arrangements, 26 and these
provisions will begin to involve the courts in reasonableness and fairness
inquiries akin to those that a fee shifting scheme would require. In
short, the establishment of appropriate fee awards under a fee shifting
system will not require skills that the courts do not already possess and
apply. Furthermore, it is not unreasonable to suppose that as the courts
develop greater experience in applying existing fee award statutes, they
will develop a surer hand in promptly and fairly adjudicating fee claims,
and will be able to apply this same skill to fee claim disputes in routine
tort litigation. It must be recalled, too, that while the substitution of
attorney fee awards for nonpecuniary damages seemingly exposes de-
fendants to a class of damages that are no less subject to potential
abuse than are noneconomic damage awards at present, the trial judge
or the parties, rather than the jury, customarily set attorneys' fees.
Consequently, fee awards are far more amenable to full appellate review
than are general damage awards. While appeals courts often review fee
awards de novo, they typically overturn general damage awards only if
those awards are "manifestly unreasonable."
Fee shifting systems have been plagued not only by the complications
of calculating appropriate fee levels, but also by several distinct classes
of unethical conduct by lawyers. One obvious problem with such systems
is that they encourage claims for unperformed work and foster unnec-
essary work, protracted litigation, and padded fee claims. The short
answer to this problem is that fraudulent or padded fee claims should
fail to the extent that they are not reasonable. They are amenable to
challenge by opposing parties and to review by the courts. One should
not make light of the administrative costs associated with litigating
questionable fee claims or minimize the risks of unethical conduct that
the promise of fee awards creates. 2 7 However, these costs and risks are
inherent in any process by which fees are paid, whether that process is
124. A recent comprehensive search of the statutes of the fifty states and the District
of Columbia enacted as of 1983, striving to identify all statutes which provided for
mandatory fee shifting in favor of one or another litigant, has located 1,974 fee shifting
statutes of which 1,602, or eighty-one percent of the total, require the court to award
"reasonable" fees to the favored party. Only thirty-six of the statutes included in the
final sample, provided fixed upper dollar ceilings, and only eighteen provided fixed dollar
amounts. See Note, supra note 88, at 323, 333-34.
125. Id.
126. See supra note 61.
127. See, Wolfram, supra note 84, for exposition of the risks of unethical conduct
associated with large formal fee awards.
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based on formal fee awards paid by opposing litigants or on the ex-
traction of the lawyer's fee from the client's general damage award.
Indeed, opportunities for abuse are as great under the present American
Rule as they would be under a fee shifting regime. It is not uncommon,
as tort litigation is now conducted, for a lawyer to press the client to
accept a smaller settlement than the strength of the claim would warrant
simply in order to be quickly done with the case. Lawyers also exact
contingency fees that are not justified by the work done. Thus, the
problem of controlling undesirable lawyer conduct is not unique to fee
shifting systems. The adoption of fee shifting in place of the American
Rule would, however, transform the problem of overstated fee claims
from one that involves a breach of trust by the lawyer in representing
his client into one that involves the defrauding of the losing defendant.
As a result of the involvement of this powerful interested party, the
courts may more routinely be asked to intervene in what has long been
a matter for resolution between lawyer and client.
Because fee awards would be paid by losing defendants, special
patterns of abuse may emerge. Defense counsel would seek to minimize
the total liability of its client for the aggregate amount of tort damages
and reasonable plaintiff's fees. "Sweetheart arrangements" between the
plaintiff's and the defendant's counsel, where the latter agrees to approve
claimed legal fees in exchange for reduction of the total damage award
for fees plus damages, would benefit the defendant and both lawyers
at the plaintiff's expense. 28 The negotiation by counsel for the plaintiff
and counsel for the defendant of an aggregate award for damages and
fees gives rise to obvious conflicts of interest for the plaintiff's counsel.
The temptation by plaintiff's counsel to apportion an overly generous
slice of the total settlement amount to fees is great and must be policed.
Professor Charles Wolfram, noting the ineffectiveness of bar disciplinary
mechanisms in controlling such conduct and the need to control the
opportunities for such conduct, has suggested that all settlements of fee
claims and plaintiffs' damages receive court approval. 29 This approval
would be conditioned on receipt from the plaintiff's counsel of affidavits
certifying that the attorneys, in negotiating the damage settlement, were
not influenced by concerns about attorneys' fees, that is, that the amounts
fixed for the plaintiff's damages and counsel's fees were determined
independently. 30 Such an affidavit might not eliminate all fraud, but
the requirement of an affirmative statement that fees and awards were
independently arrived at would greatly reduce the likelihood of miscon-
duct by all but the most cynical and incorrigible.
128. Id.
129. Wolfram, supra note 84, at 312.
130. Id.
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A more elusive objection to fee shifting than potential administrative
difficulties is that the award of reasonable attorneys' fees in tort litigation
would reduce the independence of plaintiffs' counsel because the setting
of such fees and the resolution of fee claim disputes would require
routine and intensive court involvement. It must be conceded, however,
that the representation of clients under the many state and federal fee
shifting statutes now in effect apparently does not suffer from any lack
of inventiveness, energy, or independence among lawyers practicing under
those statutes. Further, many tort revision acts have already reduced
some degree of lawyer autonomy in negotiating fee arrangements with
clients by according clients the right to challenge such arrangements in
the courts. 3' It is nonetheless conceivable that more routine involvement
by the courts in reviewing fee arrangements would subtly change the
plaintiff's lawyer's self-conception, emphasizing the lawyer's role as docket
manager and gatekeeper of the remedy system and his dependency on
the process of judicial administration for his fees. The plaintiffs' bar
has become accustomed to its making fee arrangements with some in-
dependence.3 2 A closely monitored fee award system, costing a measure
of this independence, may seem less attractive to plaintiffs' attorneys
than continued reliance on general damage awards, at least so long as
the plaintiffs' bar believes that it is well-served by general damage
awards. However, there can be no convincing objection to more routine
and effective oversight of the fairness of fee arrangements, given the
absence of true negotiation between plaintiffs and their attorneys that
has plagued contingent fee arrangements.' 3
IV. CONCLUSION
The widespread adoption of statutes limiting nonpecuniary damages
requires a fresh appraisal of the remedy functions performed by these
awards and a renewed consideration of whether alternative provisions
should be made for accomplishing these remedy objectives. One function
performed by nonpecuniary damage awards is the payment of the plain-
tiff's attorneys' fee obligations, a form of damages that are not directly
unrecoverable under the American Rule. The recent restriction of tort
remedies has jeopardized this practical remedy function.
This article suggests that an appropriate response to these remedy
restrictions would be the award of attorneys' fees to prevailing plaintiffs
rather than the reinstatement of noneconomic damages awards. The
special appeal of restricting noneconomic damages to nominal amounts
and reorienting compensation towards quantifiable injuries is that damage
131. Id.
132. Leubsdorf, supra note 26, at 31.
133. Wolfram, supra note 84, at 297.
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awards could be more openly identified with the injuries to which they
actually correspond and therefore could be calculated more accurately.
One valuable by-product of this increased accuracy and candor might
be a reduction of the skepticism about plaintiffs' awards that has un-
dermined public confidence in the legitimacy of tort remedies.
The current round of tort reform has focused primarily on the
confinement of plaintiffs' remedies. Future rounds should focus on the
development of approaches to remedies that promote adequate and
rational compensation both for quantifiable tort injuries and for the
expenses of vindicating tort claims. Noneconomic damage awards, despite
their imperfections, have survived the recent round of tort reform and
remain a substantial component of tort remedies. Granting fee awards
to prevailing plaintiffs in lieu of continuing reliance on general damage
awards should be the next reform of the remedy system.

